Satisfiability of General Intruder Constraints with and without a Set Constructor by Avanesov, Tigran et al.
HAL Id: hal-01405842
https://hal.inria.fr/hal-01405842
Submitted on 1 Dec 2016
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non,
émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de
recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires
publics ou privés.
Satisfiability of General Intruder Constraints with and
without a Set Constructor
Tigran Avanesov, Yannick Chevalier, Michaël Rusinowitch, Mathieu Turuani
To cite this version:
Tigran Avanesov, Yannick Chevalier, Michaël Rusinowitch, Mathieu Turuani. Satisfiability of General
Intruder Constraints with and without a Set Constructor. Journal of Symbolic Computation, Elsevier,
2017, 80, pp. 27-61. ￿10.1016/j.jsc.2016.07.009￿. ￿hal-01405842￿
Satisfiability of General Intruder Constraints
with and without a Set Constructor
Tigran Avanesov
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Abstract
Many decision problems on security protocols can be reduced to solving deduction constraints
expressing whether an instance of a given message pattern can be constructed by the intruder.
Most constraint solving procedures for protocol security rely on two properties of constraint
systems called monotonicity and variable-origination. In this work we relax these restrictions
by giving a decision procedure for solving general intruder constraints (that do not have these
properties) that stays in NP. The result is also valid modulo an associative, commutative and
idempotent theory. The procedure can be applied to verify security protocols in presence of
multiple intruders.
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1. Introduction
Detecting flaws in security protocol specifications under the perfect cryptography
assumption in the Dolev-Yao intruder model is an approach that has been extensively
investigated in recent years Armando et al. (2014); Groza and Minea (2013); Viganò (2012);
Meadows (2011); Blanchet (2009); Guttman (2007); Arapinis and Duflot (2007); Turuani
(2006). In particular, symbolic constraint solving has proved to be a very successful
approach in the area. It amounts to expressing the possibility of mounting an attack, e.g.
the derivation of a secret, as a list of steps where for each step an instance of the message
pattern awaited according to the protocol has to be derived from the current intruder
knowledge. These steps correspond in general to the progression of the protocol execution,
up to the last one which is the secret derivation.
Enriching the standard Dolev-Yao intruder model with different equational theories
Comon-Lundh and Shmatikov (2003); Comon-Lundh (2004); Basin et al. (2005); Chevalier
and Rusinowitch (2010); Baskar et al. (2010); Escobar et al. (2011) like exclusive OR,
modular exponentiation, Abelian groups, etc. Liu and Lynch (2011); Erbatur et al. (2011);
Malladi (2012); Chevalier et al. (2005); Küsters and Truderung (2008) helps to find flaws
that could not be detected considering free symbols only. A particularly useful theory is
the theory of an ACI operator (that is associative, commutative and idempotent) since it
allows one to express sets in cryptographic protocols.
Up to the exception of Mazaré (2005), all proposed algorithms rely on two strong
assumptions about the constraints to be processed:
• knowledge monotonicity, reflecting the fact the the intruder could see everything that
occurred before and forgot nothing;
• variable origination, reflecting that each variation in the protocol is introduced by the
intruder.
Constraints satisfying these hypotheses are called well-formed constraints in the literature.
Well-formed constraints are sufficient to solve security problems in the standard case
where a single Dolev-Yao intruder is assumed. However, we will see that in some situations
it can be quite useful to relax these hypotheses and consider general constraints, that
is constraints without the restrictions above. General constraints naturally occur when
considering security problems involving several non-communicating Dolev-Yao intruders
(see § 2.1). Note that if intruders can communicate during protocol execution, the model
becomes attack-equivalent to one with a unique Dolev-Yao intruder Syverson et al. (2000).
A discussion on a multiple non-collaborating attackers model as well as interesting
examples can be found in Fiazza et al. (2012).
1.1. Contributions of the paper
First, we will show that as for the standard case, in this more general framework it
is still possible to derive an NP decision procedure for detecting attacks on a bounded
number of protocol sessions (Sections 5, 4). Second, our result extends previous ones
by allowing non-atomic keys (which is an important feature for protocol design as it is
common to build symmetric keys from shared secrets) and the usage of an associative
“AVANTSSAR: Automated Validation of Trust and Security of Service-oriented Architectures” (http:
//www.avantssar.eu) and FP7-ICT Project no. 256980, “NESSoS: Network of Excellence on Engineering
Secure Future Internet Software Services and Systems” (http://www.nessos-project.eu).
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commutative idempotent operator (Sections 3, 4) that can be used for instance to model
sets of nodes in XML document (see § 2.2). This extension of well-formed constraint
systems may seem trivial but a third contribution of this paper is to demonstrate this is
not the case by considering subterm deduction systems which are akin to the Dolev-Yao
deduction system, but in which the equational theory can be any subterm convergent one.
Whereas the decidability of well-formed constraint systems for subterm deduction systems
is well known, see e.g. Baudet (2005), we prove in Appendix A that the satisfiability of
general constraint systems is not decidable for subterm deduction systems. Finally we
will sketch several applications of our results to security analysis in Section 2.
1.2. Related work
The decision procedure for satisfiability of well-formed constraint systems can be
used to decide the insecurity of cryptographic protocols with a bounded number of
sessions Rusinowitch and Turuani (2003). In this domain, several works deviated from the
perfect cryptography assumption and started to consider algebraic properties of functional
symbols. For example properties of XOR operator and exponentiation were considered
in Lynch and Meadows (2004); Chevalier et al. (2005, 2008); Dougherty and Guttman
(2013) and together with homomorphic symbol in Delaune (2006). A class of monoidal
equational theories was studied in Delaune et al. (2008) including the ACUI theory which
is quite similar to the ACI theory discussed in the present work, but the absence of a
unit element in ACI seems to put the ACI theory out of scope of their method. Moreover
Delaune et al. (2008) does not show the NP complexity of their procedure. We note that
in Chevalier et al. (2007) the authors showed the NP -completeness for the AC theory,
while Dolev-Yao deduction system was extended with a rule x · y → x, where · is an
AC symbol. We will examine the ACI theory within the similar deduction system. Note
also that some algebraic properties (like associative and commutative symbol) make the
insecurity problem undecidable Bursuc et al. (2007).
All the decidability results mentioned above consider systems of constraints with two
restrictions namely knowledge monotonicity (the left-hand side of a constraint representing
the current knowledge of the intruder is included into the left-hand side of the next one)
and variable origination (variable appears first in the right-hand side of some constraint):
this limitation is not impeding the solution of usual protocol insecurity problems since
the constraints generated with an active Dolev-Yao intruder are of the required type. An
attempt to swerve from well-formed constraints was made in Mazaré (2005) where the
knowledge monotonicity was relaxed to define “quasi well-formed” whose satisfiability is
proven to be in NP. This result was later extended in Mazaré (2006) to general constraint
systems but under the provision that all keys are atomic, an hypothesis that permits to
guess at the start of the procedure which keys are available at which step to the intruder.
However to our knowledge no extension of Dolev-Yao deduction system to non-atomic
symmetric key or to algebraic properties has been shown decidable for general constraint
systems. Moreover, satisfiability of well-formed constraints with the ACI theory was not
considered before. We have presented our results without proofs in a conference paper
Avanesov et al. (2010). In this long version we give detailed proofs. We believe that
they can be useful for readers that want to study general constraints for other intruder
theories.
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Figure 1. Untrusted routers
2. Motivating examples
2.1. Protocol analysis with several intruders
Security analysis of a protocol is usually conducted in the worst possible case: a single
intruder (or a coalition of several intruders, but able to share information faster than nor-
mal commnications) controls all the network. However some protocols, especially routing
protocols, are designed to work through different, non-communicating sub-networks. A
relevant analysis of such protocols must take into account that the security of the protocol
depends on the (correct) assumption that some communications are not possible. In these
cases one needs to consider a less powerful intruder, or rather a collection thereof, that
still controls some parts of the network but remains completely ignorant of what happens
in other parts.
Suppose several agents (A,B . . . , see Figure 1) execute a protocol i.e. a specified
finite sequence of message emissions or receptions. Due to their (long distance) layout
they have to transmit data through routers (1, 2, 3 . . . ). The routing tables of all honest
routers/agents are static (messages follow always the same path). Some routers (2, 5, 7)
may be compromised: an intruder managed to install a device controlling input and output
of the router or implanted there his malicious code. A message circulated via such an
untrusted channel (e.g. DB) is consumed by the corresponding compromised device (local
intruder) (7) thereby increasing his knowledge. Moreover, a local intruder can forge and
emit to an endpoint (C,B,D) of any channel he controls (BD,DB,DC) any message he
can build using the content of his memory and some available transformations specified
by a deduction system. Because of the network topology malicious routers have no means
to communicate (there are no links between them, neither direct nor via other routers),
but at some point the intruder can gather the knowledge of all the compromised routers
(by physically collecting devices or reading their memory).
In this framework the Coordinated attack problem is to decide whether it is possible
to initially give instructions to compromised routers (e.g. by reprogramming malicious
devices) to force an execution such that honest agents following the protocol will reveal
some secret data to the intruder (i.e. the intruder can deduce it using information collected
at the end from all local intruders).
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2.1.1. The coordinated attack problem
We give here a semi-formal description of the problem and some directions to solve it.
A formal model can be found in Avanesov et al. (2010) or Avanesov (2011).
First we introduce some notations and definitions that will be detailed in the technical
part of the paper (§ 3).
2.1.1.1. Messages. We consider messages as first-order terms built from a set of function
symbols (such as encryption, pairing, etc. ), a set of constants A (representing elementary
pieces of data: texts, public keys, names of agents, etc) and a set of variables X . Let T
be the set of all possible terms. For a term t we denote by Vars (t) the set of all variables
in t. A term t is a ground term, if Vars (t) = ∅. The set of ground terms is denoted by Tg.
We define a substitution σ = {x1 7→ t1, . . . , xk 7→ tk} (where xi ∈ X and ti ∈ T ) to
be the mapping σ : T → T , such that tσ is a term obtained by replacing, for all i, each
occurrence of a variable xi by the corresponding term ti. If T ⊆ T , then by definition
Tσ = {tσ : t ∈ T}. A substitution σ is ground if for any i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, ti is ground.
2.1.1.2. Agents. We will call honest communicating parties agents. Every agent is
identified by its name. We denote the set of agent names by A.
2.1.1.3. Channels. Any two agents a and b communicate through a directed channel
a ⇀ b implemented as a queue. The sent messages are stored in a queue to be processed
in order of arrival.
2.1.1.4. Agents’ behavior. Each agent has a specific sequence of actions to execute.
Every action is either of reception type ?fr (expecting a message r from agent f) or
emission type !ts (sending a message s to an agent with name t). Here r and s are
terms representing message patterns. For example, if the sequence of actions of agent
a is ?b aenc (X, pka) , !c aenc (X, pkc) (where X is a variable and pka, pkc are constants
denoting a public key of a and a public key of c correspondingly and aenc (u, v) is an
asymmetric encryption of u with key v) then a waits until he/she receives some message t
matching a pattern aenc (X, pka) on a channel b ⇀ a and sends a message aenc (Xσ, pkb)
on channel a ⇀ c, where σ is a substitution satisfying t = aenc (X, pka)σ. For instance,
if a receives aenc (s, pka), i.e. some atomic value s asymmetrically encrypted with a
public key of a pka, then the corresponding substitution σ is {X 7→ s} and a sends to
c the value of s reencrypted with public key pkc of c. On the other hand, it could be
σ = {X 7→ pair (b, s)} if b sent aenc (pair (b, s) , pka). Note that if the message does not
match the expected pattern, the agent stops this execution. Once a variable is instantiated
on a reception, its value can be used in the following agent actions.
2.1.1.5. Intruder model. We assume that some communication channels are controlled
by N local intruders from a set I = {Ii}i=1,...,N and no channel is controlled by more than
one intruder. Given some channel c, we denote by ι(c) the local intruder that controls c
when there is one.
Every intruder I is given some initial knowledge K0I that is a set of ground terms.
Once an agent sends a message via a channel controlled by an intruder, the intruder
reads it and blocks it. Reading the message means extending intruder’s current knowledge
with this message. An intruder controlling a channel can generate a message from his
knowledge using deduction rules and send it to its endpoint.
We now specify the intruder capabilities.
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Definition 2.1. A rule is a tuple of terms written as s1, . . . , sk → s, where s1, . . . , sk, s
are terms. A deduction system D is a set of rules.
As an example of deduction system, we refer to a version of the classical Dolev-Yao
deduction system (DY) presented in Table 1.
Table 1. DY deduction rules
Composition rules Decomposition rules
t1, t2 → enc (t1, t2) enc (t1, t2) , t2 → t1
t1, t2 → aenc (t1, t2) aenc (t1, t2) , priv (t2)→ t1
t1, t2 → pair (t1, t2) pair (t1, t2)→ t1
t1,priv (t2)→ sig (t1, priv (t2)) pair (t1, t2)→ t2
From now to the end of this section rules are assumed to belong to a fixed deduction
system D and that terms are evaluated modulo a congruence on terms ≡E by an equational
theory (a set of equations between terms together with the properties of equality) E .
Given two sets of ground terms E, F and a rule l → r, we write E →l→r F iff
F = E ∪{s}, s ≡E r and l ⊆ E, where l is a set of terms. We write E → F iff there exists
rule l→ r such that E →l→r F .
Definition 2.2. A derivation D is a finite sequence of finite sets of ground terms
E0, E1, . . . , En such that E0 → E1 → · · · → En, where Ei = Ei−1 ∪ {ti} , for all
i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. A term t is derivable modulo an equational theory E from a set of terms E
iff there exists a derivation D = E0, . . . , En such that E0 = E and there exists s ∈ En
such that s ≡E t. We denote by derE(E) the set of terms derivable from E modulo E . A
set of terms T is derivable from E, iff T ⊆ derE(E).
When the equational theory E is clear from context we write Der (E) instead of
derE(E), and similarly omit any reference to it. Informally, a local intruder may build new
messages from the messages he knows by applying the deduction rules (e.g. concatenate
two messages he knows). At each step a local intruder having recorded messages t1, . . . , tn
can send a message m if m ∈ Der ({t1, . . . , tn}).
2.1.1.6. Protocol execution. Given a set of protocol participants (agents) with their
sequences of actions to execute, communication channels and local intruders each one
with some initial knowledge, the course of events develops as follows. Each agent access
channels connecting her to other agents. To send a message to Bob Alice inserts the
message in the queue representing the channel, and to receive it Bob takes the first
message in the queue and matches it against the pattern of the awaited message. An
intruder Charlie controlling the channel may add, remove, read or reorder as he wishes
messages in the queue.
2.1.1.7. Offline communication. At some execution point initially specified, the current
knowledge of all local intruders is shared in order to derive a secret which probably they
cannot deduce separately. We consider our intruder model is reasonable for covering
situations where offline interactions between intruders are time-consuming and may be
detected and therefore they take place when the protocol is over, when the honest agents
have finished to execute their roles.
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2.1.1.8. Coordinated attack problem. We are now able to define what is an attack by
several local intruders on a protocol.
Coordinated attack problem (CAP)
Input: A finite set of agents A, list of actions per agent {〈a, la〉}a∈A, a set of local
intruders I = {Ii}i=1,...,N each with initial knowledge K0Ii , and a partial function ι that
assigns at most one intruder ι(c) to each channel c. and some sensitive data given as a
ground term s.
Output: Yes iff there is a sequence of actions performed by agents and local intruders
such that, at some point, from the union of intruders knowledge it is possible to derive
s.
2.1.2. Reduction of the CAP to the satisfiability of a constraint system
We sketch in this section a non-deterministic reduction of the coordinated attack problem
to the satisfiability of a constraint system. Briefly put, this reduction guesses an ordering
of messages sent and received by the agents. Each intruder diverts all the messages put
in a queue he has access to, and all messages received by agents are actually sent by the
intruder. A guessed execution may be infeasible if the algorithm guesses an ordering in
which an intruder who must send a message is unable to construct a message matching
the awaited message pattern. We thus introduce constraints imposing that given a set E
of messages known by an intruder, he has to construct a message matching a pattern t.
Definition 2.3. Let E be an equational theory, E be a set of terms and t be a term. We
define the couple (E, t) denoted E  t to be a constraint modulo E . A constraint system
modulo E is a set
S = {Ei  ti}i=1,...,n
where n is a non negative integer and Ei  ti is a constraint modulo E for i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
A ground substitution σ is a model of constraint modulo E E  t (or σ satisfies this
constraint) if tσ ∈ Der (Eσ). A ground substitution σ is a model of a constraint system
Smodulo E if it satisfies all the constraints of S. In order to simplify notations, when the
equational theory E is clear from context we will omit any reference to it.
To express the problem with constraints we first guess an order in which the agents
execute their actions since several interleavings are possible. Once the order is fixed, we
build the constraint system S (initially empty) incrementally by progressing in the action
list:
• Agent a executes !bt on channel a ⇀ b:
· if a ⇀ b is controlled by I we increase the knowledge of Intruder I with t by setting
KI := KI ∪ {t} ;
· otherwise we put t directly in the channel queue.
• Agent a executes ?bt on channel b ⇀ a:
· if b ⇀ a is controlled by I we add a constraint KI  t into S expressing the fact that
Intruder I knowing KI must send a message compatible with the expected message
pattern t;
· otherwise we must ensure that the first message m in the queue of b ⇀ a is compatible
with the expected pattern t, i.e. mσ = tσ, where σ is a ground substitution satisfying
all other constraints in S. For the case of DY deduction system we can encode this
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(a) Normal execution + Intruders
layout
la : !bn, ?c enc (pair (n,X) , kac) , !b aenc (s,X)
lb : ?aY, !c aenc (pair (Y, kb) , kc) , ?a aenc (s, kb)
lc : ?b aenc (Z, kc) , !a enc (Z, kac)
(b) Sequence of actions per agent
K0I1 ∪ {n} Y (1)
K0I2 ∪ {aenc (pair (Y, kb) , kc)} aenc (Z, kc) (2)
{enc (Z, kac)} enc (pair (n,X) , kac) (3)
K0I1 ∪ {n, aenc (s,X)} aenc (s, kb) (4)
K0I1 ∪ {n, aenc (s,X)} ∪K
0
I2 ∪ {aenc (pair (Y, kb) , kc)} s
(5)
(c) Constraint system
Figure 2. Example illustrations
equation by a constraint {enc (m, k)}  enc (t, k) for some atom k 2 since we can
prove they admit the same solutions. We add the constraint to S and remove m from
the queue.
Finally, we add (
⋃
I∈IKI)  s to S which expresses the offline communication phase:
Secret s can be deduced from the union of local intruders knowledge.
It is clear that if there exists a substitution σ that satisfies S CAP. Conversely an
attack for the CAP orders and instantiates the message patterns in the description of the
protocol with a substitution σ, which satisfies the constraint system constructed as above.
We give an example below and will show in Sections 3 and 4 that the satisfiability
of constraint systems is in NP in the case of the Dolev-Yao deduction theory and its
extension with an associative-commutative idempotent operator. This kind of operator
can be useful to model messages in XML format as is shown in next subsection.
2.1.3. Example.
Suppose three agents a, b, c execute a protocol whose normal execution is shown in
Figure 2(a). Each agent follows his sequence of actions shown in Figure 2(b). Agent a
wants to send a secret s to b. He asks b to send her public key kb to c, that will forward
it to a. Nonce n permits a to correlate the message from c with his request.
The agents are connected by three directed channels: channel a ⇀ b is controlled by
local intruder I1, channel b ⇀ c is controlled by local intruder I2, while channel c ⇀ a is
secure (free from intruders).
We assume that the two local intruders have as initial knowledge a pair of fresh pub-
lic/private keys and public keys of all participants: K0I1 = K
0
I2
= {ki,priv (ki) , ka, kb, kc}.
The question we ask is whether the local intruders I1 and I2 can cooperate in such a
way that joining their final knowledge they can derive s, although they have no means to
communicate during the protocol execution.
Following the sequence of actions shown in Figure 2(a), we obtain the constraint system
shown in Figure 2(c). First a sends n which is intercepted by I1. The knowledge of I1
2 for different deduction systems and equational theories the encoding may vary.
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becomes KI1 = K
0
I1
∪ {n}. Then I1 must build from his knowledge a message that can be
accepted by b. This is expressed in (1). Once b accepts this message, he executes his next
action: emission of a message on channel b ⇀ c. This message is intercepted by I2 and his
knowledge becomes KI2 = K
0
I2
∪ {aenc (pair (Y, kb) , kc)}. Now, I2 must send a message
to c on behalf of b (2). Then c accepts a message sent by I2, it sends his reply to a which
should be compatible with the expected pattern: enc (Z, kac) = enc (pair (n,X) , kac).
This fact is encoded into (3). Then a sends a message to b intercepted by I1 (KI1 =
K0I1 ∪ {n, aenc (s,X)}) and I1 must generate a message acceptable by b (4). Finally, in
(5) we specify that from the common knowledge of I1 and I2 one may deduce a secret s.
The obtained constraint system has no solution as well as any other constraint systems
generated from different interleaving of actions executed by the agents. We conclude
that there is no coordinated attack under the given hypothesis. On the other hand, if
I1 and I2 can communicate, or the same intruder controls both channels a ⇀ b and
b ⇀ c, a simple attack can be mounted: once the intruder receives n on channel a ⇀ b,
he generates the message aenc (pair (n, ki) , kc) and sends it via b ⇀ c; c accepts it and
sends message enc (pair (n, ki) , kac) to a which matches the expected pattern. Thus, a
will send via a ⇀ b a message aenc (s, ki) which is intercepted by the intruder and can
be decomposed using priv (ki). The intruder can also finalize the actions of b by sending
him, e.g., n and then aenc (s, kb).
2.2. Attacks exploiting XML format of messages
We propose a way to model some attacks based on an XML-representation of messages.
A different technique to handle this kind of attacks was presented in Chevalier et al.
(2007) which considers multisets of XML nodes, while in this work the notion of set is
taken as a basis.
We consider an e-shop that accepts e-cheques, and we suppose that it is presented by
a Web Service using the SOAP protocol for exchanging messages.
It consists of two services:
(1) the first exposes the list of goods for sale with their prices and processes the orders
by accepting payment;
(2) the second is a delivery service; it receives information from the first one about
successfully paid orders, and sends the ordered goods to the buyer.
A simple scenario for ordering items is shown in Figure 3. First, a client sends an order
using the e-shop interface that consists of an item identifier, e-cheque, delivery address
and some comments. Then, the first service of the e-shop checks whether the price of
the ordered item corresponds to the received cheque. If it does, the service consumes the
cheque and forwards the order to the stock/delivery service (without the used e-cheque).
Stock and Delivery service prepares a parcel for the ordered item and sends it to given
address. The comment is automatically printed on the parcel to give some information to
the postman about, for example, delivery time or access instructions.
Suppose Alice has an e-cheque for 5e. She can buy a simple pen (with ItemID simple)
but she likes very much a more expensive gilded one (with ItemID gilded). Can we help
Alice to get what she wants for what she has?
Let us formalize the behaviour of scenario players. We will write (t1 · . . . · tn) (or equiv-
alently · (t1, . . . , tn)) an XML message where t1, . . . , tn are XML nodes. We model the
fact that the nodes are not duplicated and their order is meaningless by assuming that · is
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Client Shop Interface
Shop Stock
 + Delivery
ItemID,Cheque,Address,Comments
Check the price of item
and use the cheque
ItemID,Address,Comments
Send ordered item to given Address
Figure 3. Ordering an item scenario
associative commutative and idempotent. Identifiers starting with a capital letter are con-
sidered as variables; numbers and identifier starting from lower-case letter are considered
as constants. We model a delivery of item with some ItemID to address Address with com-
ments Comments by the following message: sig ((ItemID ·Address ·Comments),priv (ks))
— a message signature produced by e-shop, where ks its public key and priv (ks) is the
corresponding private key, such that no one can produce this message except the shop.
We abstract away from the procedure of checking the item price and will suppose that
Shop Interface expects a 5e e-cheque for Item “simple”. For simplicity we assume only
two items.
We will use the same notation as in § 2.1 for emission and reception actions.
For Shop Interface we have:
?Client(simple · cheque5 · IAddr · IComm);
!Delivery(simple · IAddr · IComm).
For Shop Stock/Delivery we have:
?Interface(DItemID ·DAddr ·DComm);
!Client sig ((DItemID ·DAddr ·DComm),priv (ks)) .
Alice initially has:
simple, gilded : identifiers of items;
cheque5 : an e-cheque for 5e;
addr : her address;
cmnts: residence digital code;
ks: a public key of the shop.
Now we build a mixed constraint system (derivation constraints and equations) to
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know whether Alice can do what she wants:
{gilded , simple, cheque5 , addr , cmnts, ks} 
(simple · cheque5 · IAddr · IComm)
(simple · IAddr · IComm) =ACI (DItemID ·DAddr ·DComm)
{gilded , simple, cheque5 , addr , cmnts, ks,
sig ((DItemID ·DAddr ·DComm),priv (ks))} 
sig ((gilded · addr ·DComm),priv (ks))

(6)
(7)
(8)
The constraint (6) shows that Alice can construct a message expected by the shop from
a client. Constraint (7) represents a request from the first to the second service of the
shop: the left-hand side is a message sent by the interface service and the right-hand side
is a message expected by the stock/delivery subservice; ≡ACI means that these messages
must be compatible (modulo ACI). The last constraint shows that from the received
values Alice can build a message that models a delivery of item with ItemID gilded.
To solve it, we first get rid of syntactic equations by applying the most general unifier;
and then of equations modulo ACI (t1 =ACI t2) by encoding them into a deducibility
constraint (as it was done in § 2.1.2).
Then, one of the solutions is:
IAddr 7→addr IComm 7→(gilded · cmnts)
DItemID 7→gilded DAddr 7→addr
DComm 7→(simple · cmnts)
From this solution we see that Alice can send an ill-formed comment (that contains
two XML-nodes), and the Delivery service parser can choose an entry with ID gilded. An
attack-request can look like this:
<ItemID>s imple</ItemID>
<Cheque>cheque5</Cheque>
<Address>addr</ Address>
<Comments>cmnts</Comments>
<ItemID>g i l d e d</ItemID>
The parser of the first service can return the value of the first occurrence of ItemID:
<ItemID>simple</ItemID>, while the parser of the second one, being a different software,
can return <ItemID>gilded</ItemID>.
This attack is possible if Alice constructs a request “by hand”, but a similar attack is
probably feasible using an XML-injection: Alice when filling a request form enters instead
of her comments the following string:
cmnts</Comments>
<ItemID>g i l d e d</ItemID><Comments>
and in the resulting request we get:
<ItemID>s imple</ItemID>
<Cheque>cheque5</Cheque>
<Address>addr</ Address>
<Comments>cmnts</Comments>
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<ItemID>g i l d e d</ItemID><Comments>
</Comments>
This kind of XML-injection attack was described in OWASP Foundation (2008).
3. Satisfiability of general DY+ACI constraint systems
In Section 2 we have shown how to reduce the problem of protocol insecurity in
presence of several intruders to solving a system of general deducibility constraints. In
this section we present a decision procedure for the satisfiability of general constraint
systems where the Dolev-Yao deduction system is extended with some deduction rules for
an associative-commutative-idempotent symbol (DY+ACI). We consider operators for
pairing, symmetric and asymmetric encryptions, signature, hashing and an ACI operator
that will be used as a set constructor.
As for the proof structure, after introducing the formal notations and some basic
properties, the main steps to show the decidability are as follows:
(1) We present an algorithm for solving the derivability problem in the DY+ACI model;
(2) We prove that for checking intruder constraints satisfiability it is sufficient to
consider normalized constraints and normalized substitutions;
(3) We show that a satisfiable normalized constraint system admits at least one conser-
vative solution, that is a substitution σ that maps each variable of the constraint
system to a set of subterms from the constraint system (instantiated with σ) and
private keys;
(4) We give a bound on the size of a conservative solution, and, as a consequence, we
obtain decidability.
3.1. Formal introduction to the problem
First we would like to note that we omit the proofs of some statements that we find
intuitive. In any case the detailed proofs may be found in Avanesov (2011) (particularly
in Lemma 4, page 33). Though the notions of terms and subterms are standard in the
litterature, they are not necessarily the most convenient when working with equational
theories. Accordingly, in this section and in addition to the standard notions, we introduce
the sets of Subterms and Quasi-subterms of a term. The notion of subterm of a term
t is the standard one, whereas quasi-subterms are subterms of the flattening of t by
successive applications of associativity rules. The notions of subterms and quasi-subterms
are equivalent on normalized terms, but one of the difficulty of handling an equational
theory is to analyze their interplay when instantiating and normalizing a term modulo
this equational theory. We also provide a few technical lemmas to adress this question in
this subsection.
Definition 3.1. Let A be a set of atoms, and X be a set of variables. Let F be the
minimal set of functional symbols containing: binary symbols pair, enc, aenc, sig, apply, ·2,
unary symbols priv, ·1, and for all i ∈ N+ an i-nary symbol ·i. The set of terms T (A,X )
is a minimal set satisfying: A ⊆ T , X ⊆ T , if t1, . . . , tk are terms and f is a k-ary symbol
from F then f(t1, . . . , tk) ∈ T . To be short we write T instead of T (A,X ).
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By sig (p,priv (a)) we mean a signature of message p with private key priv (a) that
does not contain a message itself (the message p together with its signature with private
key priv (a) can be modeled as pair (p, sig (p, priv (a)))).
We consider the following family of function symbols (indexed by their fixed arities):⋃
i∈N+ {·i}. Symbol ·i has a list of i terms as its arguments. Since the arity can be inferred
from the number of arguments, we write · (t1, t2) as a shortcut for ·2(t1, t2), · (t1, t2, t3)
as a shortcut for ·3(t1, t2, t3) and so on.
We denote dom (σ)the domain {x1, . . . , xn} of a substitution σ = {x1 7→ t1, . . . , xn 7→ tn}
and img (σ) = dom (σ)σ =
⋃
x∈dom(σ) {xσ} its image. The cardinality of a set P is denoted
by |P |.
We denote bin any element of {enc, aenc,pair, sig, apply}. The root of a term t ∈ T is
denoted root (t) and is defined as follows:
root (t) =

bin, if t = bin (p, q) ;
·, if t = · (L) ;
priv, if t = priv (p) ;
t, if t ∈ X ∪ A.
We denote the i-th term of a list of terms L as L[i] and we write t ∈ L if t occurs as
an element of L. We also define two binary relations ⊆ and ≈ on lists as follows: L1 ⊆ L2
iff every element of L1 is an element of L2; L1 ≈ L2 iff L1 ⊆ L2 and L2 ⊆ L1 (we use the
same definition if L1 or L2 is a set).
In Definition 3.2 we present algebraic properties of the · symbol (denoted as ACI),
that are considered together with the Dolev-Yao deduction system in this section. In the
rest of this paper deduction constraints are always modulo this ACI equational theory.
Definition 3.2. We define ≡ACI to be the congruence relation on T generated by the
equational theory ACI:
{· (y) = y, · (y1, y1) = · (y1) , · (y1, y2) = · (y2, y1)} ∪⋃∞
n=1 {· (t1, . . . , tk, · (tk+1, . . . , tm) , tm+1, . . . , tn) = · (t1, . . . , tn)}0≤k<m≤n .
Since · is variadic, the associativity property is expressed above as an infinite set of
flattening rules.
Definition 3.3. The set of elements of a term t ∈ T is denoted elems (t) and defined by:
elems (t) =
{⋃
p∈L elems (p) if t = · (L) ;
{t} , otherwise.
We extend elems () to sets of terms or lists of terms T by elems (T ) =
⋃
t∈T elems (t).
Example 1. The set of elements of t = · (a, · (b, a,pair (a, b)) ,pair (· (b, b) , a)) is elems (t) =
{a, b,pair (· (b, b) , a) ,pair (a, b)}.
Definition 3.4. Let ≺ be a strict total order on T such that the question whether p ≺ q
can be answered in polynomial time.
Definition 3.5. The normal form of a term t (denoted by ptq) and a set of terms T
(denoted by pTq) is defined in a mutually recursive way (on their size) by:
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(1) ptq = t, if t ∈ X ∪ A;
(2) pbin (t1, t2)q = bin (pt1q , pt2q) ;
(3) ppriv (t)q = priv (ptq);
(4) p· (L)q =

· (L′) , if |pelems (L)q| > 1 and L′ ≈ pelems (L)q
and for all i < j, L′[i] ≺ L′[j];
t′, if pelems (L)q = {t′}
(5) pTq = {ptq : t ∈ T}
We say a term t is normalized iff t = ptq.
We note right away that |Tσ| ≤ |T | and |pTq| ≤ |T | and two terms are congruent
modulo the ACI properties of ′′.′′ iff they have the same normal form. In particular
the following equalities hold: p· (t, t)q = ptq, p· (t1, t2)q = p· (t2, t1)q, p· (· (t1, t2) , t3)q =
p· (t1, · (t2, t3))q = p· (t1, t2, t3)q.
Note also that normalization is idempotent: pptqq = ptq. Moreover the equivalence
relation ≡ACI is closed under substitution (see Baader and Nipkow (1998)), i.e. t1 ≡ACI t2
implies t1σ ≡ACI t2σ. Therefore, we obtain t ≡ACI ptq and tσ ≡ACI ptqσ, and then
ptσq = pptqσq. Furthermore ptσq = pptqσq = pt pσqq = pptq pσqq.
Given its importance we turn this last property into a lemma.
Lemma 1. For any term t and substitution σ we have ptσq = pptq pσqq.
Example 2. In Example 1 we have ptq = · ({a, b,pair (a, b) ,pair (b, a)}).
We give some useful properties of elems (·) function with respect to normalization.
Lemma 2. For any term t, pelems (t)q = elems (ptq).
Proof. This statement is trivial, if t 6= · (L). Otherwise, let t = · (t1, . . . , tn).
(1) If pelems (t)q = {p}, where p 6= · (Lp). Then ptq = p and then elems (ptq) =
elems (p) = {p} = pelems (t)q;
(2) If pelems (t)q = {p1, . . . , pk}, k > 1, where pi 6= · (Li) for all i. Then ptq = · (L),
where L ≈ {p1, . . . , pk}. That means that elems (ptq) =
⋃
p∈{p1,...,pk} elems (p) =
{p1, . . . , pk}.
2
Lemma 3. For any terms t1, . . . , tm, we have p· (pt1q , . . . , ptmq)q = p· (t1, . . . , tm)q
Proof. Follows from the definition of normal form and Lemma 2. 2
Lemma 4. For terms t1, . . . , tm, we have:
elems (p· (pt1q , . . . , ptmq)q) = elems (· (pt1q , . . . , ptmq)) =
⋃
i=1,...,m elems (ptiq)
Proof. We get the first equality by applying Lemma 2: elems (p· (pt1q , . . . , ptmq)q) =
pelems (· (pt1q , . . . , ptmq))q and then from Definition 3.3 and Lemma 2 we have that
elems (· (pt1q , . . . , ptmq)) is a set of normalized terms. The second equality directly follows
from Definition 3.3. 2
We introduce now quasi− subterms as subterms of terms flattened by applications of
associativity rules.
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Definition 3.6. The set of quasi-subterms of term t is defined as follows:
QSub (t) =

{t}, if t ∈ X ∪ A;
{t} ∪QSub (t1) , if t = priv (t1) ;
{t} ∪QSub (t1) ∪QSub (t2) , if t = bin (t1, t2) ;
{t} ∪
⋃
p∈elems(L) QSub (p) , if t = · (L)
If T is a set of terms then QSub (T ) =
⋃
t∈T QSub (t). If S = {Ei  ti}i=1,...,n is a
constraint system then QSub (S) =
⋃
t∈
⋃n
i=1
Ei∪{ti}QSub (t).
Example 3. Referring to Example 1, we have
QSub (t) = {· (a, · (b, a,pair (a, b)) ,pair (· (b, b) , a)) , a, b, pair (a, b) ,pair (· (b, b) , a) , · (b, b)}.
Note also that QSub (QSub (t)) = QSub (t) and s = psq for all s ∈ QSub (ptq).
Let us now define the set Sub(t) of subterms of a term t.
Definition 3.7. Let t be a term. We define Sub (t) as follows:
Sub (t) =

{t}, if t ∈ X ∪ A;
{t} ∪ Sub (t1) , if t = priv (t1) ;
{t} ∪ Sub (t1) ∪ Sub (t2) , if t = bin (t1, t2) ;
{t} ∪
⋃
p∈L Sub (p) , if t = · (L) .
If T is a set of terms, then Sub (T ) =
⋃
t∈T Sub (t). If S = {Ei  ti}i=1,...,n is a constraint
system, we define Sub (S) =
⋃
t∈
⋃n
i=1
Ei∪{ti} Sub (t).
Example 4. Referring to Example 1, we have
Sub (t) = QSub (t) ∪ {· (b, a,pair (a, b))}.
Lemma 5. For any term t and substitution σ, Sub (tσ) = Sub (t)σ ∪ Sub (Vars (t)σ).
Proof. By induction on |Sub (t)|
• |Sub (t)| = 1.
· t ∈ A. As tσ = t and Vars (t) = ∅, the statement becomes trivial;
· t ∈ X . Then Sub (t)σ = tσ, Vars (t) = {t}; and as for any term p, p ∈ Sub (p), we
have Sub (tσ) = {tσ} ∪ Sub (tσ).
• Suppose that for any t : |Sub (t)| < k (k ≥ 1), the statement is true;
• Given a term t : |Sub (t)| = k, k > 1. Let us consider all possible cases:
· t = bin (t1, t2).Then tσ = bin (t1σ, t2σ) and Vars (t) = Vars (t1)∪Vars (t2). Sub (tσ) =
{tσ}∪Sub (t1σ)∪Sub (t2σ) = (as |Sub (ti)| < k) = {tσ}∪Sub (t1)σ∪Sub (Vars (t1)σ)∪
Sub (t2)σ∪Sub (Vars (t2)σ) = {tσ}∪Sub (t1)σ∪Sub (t2)σ∪Sub ((Vars (t1) ∪Vars (t2))σ) =
Sub (t)σ ∪ Sub (Vars (t)σ);
· t = priv (t1). The proof is the same as for the previous case;
· t = · (t1, . . . , tm). Then tσ = · (t1σ, . . . , tmσ) and Vars (t) =
⋃
i=1,...,m Vars (ti).
Then we have Sub (tσ) = {tσ} ∪
⋃
i=1,...,m Sub (tiσ) = (as |Sub (ti)| < k) = {tσ} ∪⋃
i=1,...,m (Sub (ti)σ ∪ Sub (Vars (ti)σ)) = {tσ} ∪
⋃
i=1,...,m Sub (ti)σ∪
∪Sub
((⋃
i=1,...,m Vars (ti)
)
σ
)
= Sub (t)σ ∪ Sub (Vars (t)σ).
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2
The inclusion relation between elems (·) ,QSub (·) and Sub (·) is stated in Lemma 6.
Lemma 6. Let t be a term. Then elems (t) ⊆ QSub (t) ⊆ Sub (t)
For normalized terms, the set of its subterms coincides with the set of its quasi-subterms:
Lemma 7. For any normalized term t, QSub (t) = Sub (t).
Proof. By induction on |Sub (t)|.
• |Sub (t)| = 1. Then t ∈ X ∪ A, and thus, QSub (t) = Sub (t) = {t};
• Suppose that for any t : |Sub (t)| < k (k > 1), QSub (t) = Sub (t);
• Given a term t : |Sub (t)| = k, k > 1. We need to show that QSub (t) = Sub (t).
· t = bin (t1, t2). Then QSub (bin (t1, t2)) = {t}∪QSub (t1)∪QSub (t2) = (as |Sub (ti)| <
k) = {t} ∪ Sub (t1) ∪ Sub (t2) = Sub (t);
· t = priv (t1). Then QSub (priv (t1)) = {t} ∪QSub (t1) = {t} ∪ Sub (t1) = Sub (t);
· t = · (L). As t is normalized, ∀p ∈ L, root (p) 6= ·. Then elems (L) ≈ L. Thus, we have
QSub (t) = {t}∪
⋃
p∈elems(L) QSub (p) = {t}∪
⋃
p∈L QSub (p) = {t}∪
⋃
p∈L Sub (p) =
Sub (t).
2
Lemma 8. For any term t, QSub (ptq) = pQSub (t)q.
Proof. By induction on |Sub (t)|.
• |Sub (t)| = 1. Then t ∈ A ∪ X . As QSub (t) = {t} and t = ptq, the statement holds;
• Suppose that for any t : |Sub (t)| < k (k > 1), the statement is true;
• Given t such that |Sub (t)| = k, k ≥ 1, let us consider all possible cases:
(1) t = bin (t1, t2).On the one hand, QSub (t) = {t} ∪ QSub (t1) ∪ QSub (t2). On the
other hand, ptq = bin (pt1q , pt2q) and then, QSub (ptq) = {ptq} ∪ QSub (pt1q) ∪
QSub (pt2q). Then, as QSub (ptiq) = pQSub (ti)q, we have that QSub (ptq) =
pQSub (t)q;
(2) t = priv (t1). The proof is the same as for previous case;
(3) t = · (L). We have QSub (t) = {t} ∪
⋃
p∈elems(L) QSub (p); From Lemma 2 we have
elems (p· (L)q) = pelems (· (L))q, and then we obtain QSub (p· (L)q) = {p· (L)q} ∪⋃
p∈elems(p·(L)q) QSub (p) = p{· (L)}q ∪
⋃
p∈elems(·(L)) QSub (ppq) = (by supposi-
tion) = p{· (L)}q ∪
⋃
p∈elems(·(L)) pQSub (p)q = p{· (L)} ∪
⋃
p∈elems(·(L)) QSub (p)q =
pQSub (t)q.
2
Lemma 9. For any term t, Sub (ptq) ⊆ pSub (t)q.
Proof. From Lemma 7 we have Sub (ptq) = QSub (ptq). By Lemma 8 we obtain QSub (ptq) =
pQSub (t)q and by Lemma 6 we have QSub (t) ⊆ Sub (t). Thus, Sub (ptq) ⊆ pQSub (t)q ⊆
pSub (t)q. 2
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Table 2. DY+ACI deduction rules
Composition rules Decomposition rules
t1, t2 → penc (t1, t2)q enc (t1, t2) , t3 → pt1q, if t2 ≡ACI t3
t1, t2 → paenc (t1, t2)q aenc (t1, t2) , priv (t3)→ pt1q, if t2 ≡ACI t3
t1, t2 → ppair (t1, t2)q pair (t1, t2)→ pt1q
t1,priv (t2)→ psig (t1,priv (t2))q pair (t1, t2)→ pt2q
t1, . . . , tm → p· (t1, . . . , tm)q · (t1, . . . , tm)→ ptiq for all i
t1, t2 → papply (t1, t2)q
3.2. Dolev-Yao deduction system modulo ACI
We define a Dolev-Yao deduction system modulo ACI (denoted DY+ACI). It consists
of composition rules and decomposition rules, depicted in Table 2 where t1, t2, . . . , tm ∈ T
(i.e., we consider an infinite system having a finite representation given in the table). Note
that rule enc (t1, t2) , t3 → pt1q, if t2 ≡ACI t3 is equivalent to enc (t1, t2) , pt2q → pt1q,
since it is always possible to normalize term t3 (and obtain pt3q = pt2q) using, e.g.
t3, t3 → ppair (t3, t3)q and since ppair (t3, t3)q = pair (pt3q , pt3q) we can decompose it by
obtaining ppt3qq = pt3q.
We introduce two restrictions to define a subset of valid ground terms. The first one
follows from the semantics of the functional symbol sig: its second argument must always
be a private key. The second one is imposed in order to simplify our reasoning for solving
constraint systems: we only consider atomic asymmetric private keys (this is not a real
limitation for many applications).
Definition 3.8. A ground term t is valid iff for any subterm s ∈ Sub (t):
(1) s = sig (p, q) =⇒ pqq = priv (q′) for some q′ ;
(2) s = priv (p) =⇒ ppq ∈ A
We suppose hereinafter that the considered constraint system S contains at least one
atom, i.e. QSub (S) ∩ A 6= ∅. Otherwise we add a dummy constraint {a} a to S which
will be satisfied by any substitution. We define priv (T ) = {priv (t) : t ∈ T} for a set of
terms T . We define Vars (S) =
⋃n
i=1 Vars (Ei) ∪ Vars (ti). We say that S is normalized,
iff for all t ∈ Sub (S), t is normalized.
Example 5. We give a example of general constraint system and its solution within
DY+ACI deduction system.
S =
 enc (x, a) ,pair (c, a)  b· (x, c)  a
 ,
where a, b, c ∈ A and x ∈ X . One of its solutions within DY+ACI is σ = {x 7→ enc (pair (a, b) , c)}.
Definition 3.9. Let T = {t1, . . . , tk} be a non-empty set of terms. Then we define π(T )
as follows:
π(T ) = p· (t1, . . . , tk)q .
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We remark that π({t}) = ptq and π(T ) = pπ(T )q. Note also that π(t1, . . . , tk) can be
interpreted as a set of terms. The terms derivable from π(t1, . . . , tk) are derivable from
t1, . . . , tk and vice-versa.
Lemma 10. Let T be a set of terms T = {t1, . . . , tk}. Then π(T ) ∈ Der (pTq) and
pTq ⊆ Der ({π(T )}).
From Lemma 3 we derive another property: π(T ) = π(pTq).
Lemma 11. π(T1 ∪ · · · ∪ Tm) = π({π(T1), . . . , π(Tm)})
Proof. From definition of π and Lemma 2, we have elems (π(Ti)) = pelems (Ti)q. Next
π({π(T1), . . . , π(Tm)}) = p· (L)q where
L≈ pelems ({π(T1), . . . , π(Tm)})q
= p
⋃
i=1,...,m
pelems (Ti)qq
= p
⋃
i=1,...,m
elems (Ti)q
On the other hand π(T1 ∪ · · · ∪ Tm) = p· (L′)q, where L′ ≈ p
⋃
i=1,...,m elems (Ti)q. 2
3.3. Solving the derivability problem of DY+ACI
The decidability of the derivability problem for DY has been extensively studied (see
e.g. Amadio et al. (2000) for the atomic keys case, and Rusinowitch and Turuani (2003) for
the complex keys case) and is known to be polynomial. Also, we note that the derivability
problem when the set of symbols only contains the dot · and constants is trivial, for in
this case a constraint E  t is satisfied if, and only if, the constants occurring in t also
occur in E (proof left to the reader). Then the combination algorithm of Chevalier and
Rusinowitch (2005) yields directly the decidability of derivability for the DY+ACI case.
Moreover since the derivability in DY and ACI sub-theories can be decided in polynomial
time the algorithm deciding derivability returns in time polynomial in the number of
subterms Cortier and Delaune (2012).
3.4. Existence of conservative solutions for satisfiable systems
In this subsection we show that for any satisfiable constraint system there exist
particular models called conservative solutions. Roughly speaking, such a model can be
defined by mapping each variable to a set of subterms and atoms extracted from the
constraint system. This will bound the search space for finding a model (see § 3.5).
First, in Proposition 1 we state that a constraint system and its normal form have
the same models and we show the equivalence between the existence of a model and
the existence of a normalized model. As a consequence we will need only to consider
normalized constraints and models in the sequel.
Proposition 1. The substitution σ is a model of the constraint system S if and only if
σ is a model of pSq. Moreover, σ is a model of S if and only if pσq is a model of S.
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Proof. By definition, σ is a model of S = {Ei  ti}i=1,...,n, iff ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n} , ptiσq ∈
Der (pEiσq). But we know that ptiσq = pptiqσq and pEiσq = ppEiqσq. Thus, σ is a
model of S if and only if σ is a model of pSq. But again, since ptiσq = pti pσqq and
pEiσq = pEi pσqq, we have σ is a model of S if and only if pσq is a model of S. 2
We introduce a transformation π(HS,σ (·)) on ground terms that replaces recursively
every occurrence of any binary symbol bin by the ACI symbol · (and flattens nested ACI
terms) when this occurrence roots a subterm that is not matched by any non-variable
subterm of the constraint system with substitution σ.
Later, we will show that π(H (σ)) is also a model of S.
Definition 3.10. We denote a set of non-variable subterms of a constraint system S as
S̊ub (S), i.e. Sub (S) \ X = S̊ub (S).
Definition 3.11. Let S be a normalized constraint system which is satisfiable with the
model σ. Let us fix some α ∈ (A ∩ Sub (S)). We define a function HS,σ (·) : Tg → 2Tg as
follows:
HS,σ (t) =

{α} , if t ∈ (A \ Sub (S));
{a} , if t = a ∈ (A ∩ Sub (S));{
priv
(
π(HS,σ (t1))
)}
, if t = priv (t1) ;{
bin
(
π(HS,σ (t1)), π(H
S,σ (t2))
)}
, if t = bin (t1, t2)
and ptq ∈ pS̊ub (S)σq ;
HS,σ (t1) ∪HS,σ (t2) , if t = bin (t1, t2)
and ptq /∈ pS̊ub (S)σq ;⋃
p∈LH
S,σ (p) , if t = · (L) .
Henceforward, we will omit parameters and write H (·) instead of HS,σ (·) for shorter
notation.
Definition 3.12. We define the superposition of π(·) and H (·) on a set of terms T =
{t1, . . . , tk} as follows: π(H (T )) = {π(H (t)) | t ∈ T}.
Definition 3.13. Let θ = {x1 7→ t1, . . . , xk 7→ tk} be a substitution. We define π(H (θ))
to be the substitution {x1 7→ π(H (t1)), . . . , xk 7→ π(H (tk))}.
Note that since for every x ∈ dom (θ) we have x /∈ Vars (xθ), we also have dom (π(H (θ))) =
dom (θ). Moreover, by definition, π(H (θ)) is normalized.
Example 6. Let us consider a (normalized) constraint system S and its model σ from
Example 5 and show that π(H (σ)) is also a model of S. π(H (enc (pair (a, b) , c))) =
π(H (pair (a, b))∪ {c}) = π({a} ∪ {b} ∪ {c}) = · (a, b, c) (we suppose that a ≺ b ≺ c). One
can see that π(H (σ)) = {x 7→ · (a, b, c)} is also a model of S within DY+ACI.
We give several useful properties about the function H (·).
19
Lemma 12. For a ground term t, H (t) =
⋃
p∈elems(t)H (p).
Lemma 13. For a ground term t, H (t) = H (ptq).
Proof. By induction on |Sub (t)|:
• |Sub (t)| = 1 is possible in the only case: t = a ∈ A and as a = paq, the equality is
trivial;
• Suppose that for any t : |Sub (t)| < k (k > 1), H (t) = H (ptq) holds;
• Given a term t : |Sub (t)| = k, k > 1. We need to prove that H (t) = H (ptq).
· if t = priv (t1), then H (t) = {priv (π(H (t1)))} = (by induction hypothesis) =
{priv (π(H (pt1q)))} = H (priv (pt1q)) = H (ptq);
· if t = bin (p, q) and ptq ∈ pS̊ub (S)σq; Then H (ptq) = H (bin (ppq , pqq)) =
{bin (π(H (ppq)), π(H (pqq)))} = (by induction) = {bin (π(pH (p)q), π(pH (q)q))} =
(by Lemma 3) = {bin (π(H (p)), π(H (q)))} = H (bin (p, q));
· if t = bin (p, q) and ptq /∈ pS̊ub (S)σq; Then H (t) = H (p) ∪H (q) = (by induction
hypothesis) = H (ppq) ∪ H (pqq) = (as pbin (ppq , pqq)q = ptq /∈ pS̊ub (S)σq) =
H (bin (ppq , pqq)) = H (ptq) ;
· if t = · (L), where L = t1, . . . , tm. Note first that as t = · (L), ∀s ∈ elems (t),
|Sub (s)| < |Sub (t)|. Then, by Lemma 12, H (t) =
⋃
p∈elems(t)H (p) = (by in-
duction hypothesis) =
⋃
p∈elems(t)H (ppq). On the other part we have H (ptq) =⋃
p∈elems(ptq)H (p) = (by Lemma 2) =
⋃
p∈pelems(t)qH (p) =
⋃
p∈elems(t)H (ppq) =
H (t).
2
As a consequence, π(H (t)) = π(H (ptq)) = pπ(H (t))q = pπ(H (ptq))q.
We also note as another consequence that π(H (·)) transforms valid terms to valid
ones.
Now, we show that for the subterms of a normalized constraint system instantiated
with its normalized model, the application of the transformation π(H (·)) on such terms
is equivalent modulo ACI to the result obtained if the transformation was applied only
on the model.
Proposition 2. Let S be a normalized constraint system and σ its normalized model.
For all t ∈ Sub (S), pt π(H (σ))q = π(H (tσ)).
Proof. Note that t is normalized. We will prove it by induction on |Sub (t)|.
• Let |Sub (t)| = 1. Then:
· either t ∈ A. In this case t ∈ (A∩Sub (S)), and as tµ = t for any substitution µ, then
π(H (tσ)) = π(H (t)) = π({t}) = t and t π(H (σ)) = t. Thus, t π(H (σ)) = π(H (tσ)).
· or t ∈ X . As σ is a model and t ∈ Sub (S), we have t ∈ dom (σ), and, by definition,
t ∈ dom (π(H (σ))). Then, by definition of π(H (σ)), t π(H (σ)) = π(H (tσ)).
• Assume that for some k ≥ 1 if |Sub (t)| ≤ k, then pt π(H (σ))q = pπ(H (tσ))q.
• Show that for any t such that |Sub (t)| ≥ k + 1, where t = bin (p, q) or t = priv (q)
or t = · (t1, . . . , tm), but |Sub (p)| ≤ k, |Sub (q)| ≤ k and |Sub (ti)| ≤ k, for all i ∈
{1, . . . ,m}, statement pt π(H (σ))q = pπ(H (tσ))q is still true. We have:
· either t = bin (p, q). As t = bin (p, q) ∈ Sub (S) ⇒ p ∈ Sub (S) and q ∈ Sub (S).
As |Sub (p)| < |Sub (t)| and from the induction assumption, we have pp π(H (σ))q =
pπ(H (pσ))q. The same holds for q.
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Again, as bin (p, q)σ ∈ S̊ub (S)σ (as bin (p, q) /∈ X and t ∈ Sub (S)) we have that
pπ(H (bin (p, q)σ))q = pπ(H (bin (pσ, qσ)))q = pπ(H (pbin (pσ, qσ)q))q =
pπ(H (bin (ppσq , pqσq)))q = pπ({bin (π(H (ppσq)), π(H (pqσq)))})q =
pπ({bin (pπ(H (pσ))q , pπ(H (qσ))q)})q = pbin (pπ(H (pσ))q , pπ(H (qσ))q)q =
pbin (pp π(H (σ))q , pq π(H (σ))q)q = pbin (p π(H (σ)), q π(H (σ)))q =
pbin (p, q)π(H (σ))q = pt π(H (σ))q .
· or t = · (t1, . . . , tm). We have for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, ti ∈ Sub (S), thus, by induc-
tion hypothesis π(H (tiσ)) = pti π(H (σ))q. π(H (tσ)) = π(H (· (t1σ, . . . , tmσ))) =
π(H (t1σ) ∪ · · · ∪H (tmσ)) = (by Lemma 11) = π({π(H (t1σ)), . . . , π(H (tmσ))}) =
π({pt1 π(H (σ))q , . . . , ptm π(H (σ))q}) = p· (pt1 π(H (σ))q , . . . , ptm π(H (σ))q)q =
p· (t1 π(H (σ)), . . . , tm π(H (σ)))q = p(· (t1, . . . , tm))π(H (σ))q = pt π(H (σ))q
· or t = priv (q). Then q ∈ Sub (S).
π(H (tσ)) = π({priv (π(H (qσ)))}) = ppriv (π(H (qσ)))q = ppriv (q π(H (σ)))q =
ppriv (q)π(H (σ))q = pt π(H (σ))q.
Thus, the proposition is proven. 2
Now we show that the derivability of a term from a set of terms is preserved by the
transformation π(H (·)). But before we recall two simple properties of the derivability
relation:
Lemma 14. Let A,B,C,D ⊆ Tg. Then if A ⊆ Der (B) and B ⊆ Der (C) then A ⊆
Der (C). Moreover, if A ⊆ Der (B) and C ⊆ Der (D) then A ∪ C ⊆ Der (B ∪D).
Proposition 3. Let S be a normalized constraint system and σ its normalized model.
For any DY+ACI rule l1, . . . , lk → r, π(H (r)) ∈ Der ({π(H (l1)), . . . , π(H (lk))}).
Proof idea. We proceed by considering all possible deduction rules. To give an idea, we
show a proof for only one rule (see the full proof in Appendix B.4): aenc (t1, t2) , ppriv (t2)q→
pt1q. We have to show that term π(H (pt1q)) is derivable from the set of terms
{π(H (aenc (t1, t2))), π(H (ppriv (t2)q))}. Consider two cases:
• ∃u ∈ S̊ub (S) such that paenc (t1, t2)q = puσq. Then
π(H (aenc (t1, t2))) = aenc (π(H (t1)), π(H (t2))), and then π(H (pt1q)) = π(H (t1)) ∈
Der ({aenc (π(H (t1)), π(H (t2))) , ppriv (π(H (t2)))q}). On the other hand, we have
π(H (ppriv (t2)q)) = π(H (priv (t2))) = π({priv (π(H (t2)))}) = ppriv (π(H (t2)))q.
• @u ∈ QSub (S) such that paenc (t1, t2)q = puσq. Then
π(H (aenc (t1, t2))) = π(H (t1)∪H (t2)). Using Lemma 10, we have pH (t1) ∪H (t2)q ⊆
Der ({π(H (aenc (t1, t2)))}), thus pH (t1)q ⊆ Der ({π(H (aenc (t1, t2)))}). And then, by
Lemma 10 we have that π(H (t1)) ∈ Der (pH (t1)q). Therefore, by Lemma 14 and
Lemma 13, π(H (pt1q)) = π(H (t1)) ∈ Der (π(H (aenc (t1, t2)))).
2
Using Propositions 2 and 3 we will show that transformation π(H (·)) preserves the
property of a substitution to be a model.
Proposition 4. Given a normalized constraint system S and its normalized model σ.
Then substitution π(H (σ)) also satisfies S.
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Proof. Suppose, without loss of generality, S = {Ei  ti}i=1,...,n. Let us take any con-
straint (E  t) ∈ S. As σ is a model of S, there exists a derivation D = A0, . . . , Ak such
that A0 = pEσq and ptσq ∈ Ak.
By Proposition 3 and Lemma 14 we can easily prove that if k > 0, π(H (Aj)) ⊆
Der (π(H (Aj−1))), j = 1, . . . , k. Then, applying transitivity of Der (·) (Lemma 14) k
times, we have that π(H (Ak)) ⊆ Der (π(H (A0))). In the case where k = 0, the statement
π(H (Ak)) ⊆ Der (π(H (A0))) is also true.
Using Proposition 2 we have that π(H (A0)) = π(H (Eσ)) = pE π(H (σ))q, as E ⊆
Sub (S). The same for t: π(H (tσ)) = pt π(H (σ))q, and as ptσq ∈ Ak, we have pt π(H (σ))q ∈
π(H (Ak)). Therefore, we have that pt π(H (σ))q ∈ π(H (Ak)) ⊆ Der (π(H (A0))) =
Der (pE π(H (σ))q), that means π(H (σ)) satisfies any constraint of S. 2
Till the end of subsection we will study a useful property of π(H (σ)). Proposition 5
and its corollary show that if a constraint system has a normalized model σ which maps
different variables to different values, then there exists another normalized model π(H (σ))
that maps any variable of its domain to an ACI-set of some non-variable subterms of the
constraint system instantiated by itself and some private keys built with atoms of the
constraint system. This kind of model will be called conservative.
Lemma 15. Given a normalized substitution σ and normalized term u. If puσq = bin (p, q)
and u /∈ X and xσ 6= yσ for all x 6= y then there exists s ∈ Sub (u) such that s = bin (p′, q′)
and psσq = bin (p, q). The same is true in the case of puσq = priv (p).
Proof. As u = puq and puσq = bin (p, q), we have:
• u not in form of · (L). Then, as u /∈ X and puσq = bin (p, q), we have u = bin (p′, q′)
(where pp′σq = p and pq′σq = q). Then we can choose s = bin (p′, q′) = u ∈ Sub (u).
• u = · (t1, . . . , tm), ∀i root (ti) 6= · and m > 1 since u = puq. Then for all i, ti is either
a variable, or bin (p′i, q
′
i). But as xσ 6= yσ for all x 6= y and as σ is normalized, we
can claim that the set {t1, . . . , tm} contains at most one variable (∃j : tj ∈ X =⇒
∀k 6= j, tk /∈ X ). Since puσq = bin (p, q) we have ∀i, j ptiσq = ptjσq, and then, as
m > 1, there exists i such that ti = bin (p
′
i, q
′
i). Then, by definition of normalization
function and from puσq = bin (p, q) we have that pelems (uσ)q = {bin (p, q)}. Thus,
pbin (p′i, q
′
i)σq = bin (p, q), i.e. we can choose s = ti, as ti ∈ Sub (u) and ti = bin (p′i, q′i).
The other case (priv) can be proved similarly. 2
Definition 3.14. A substitution σ is a conservative model of a constraint system S, iff
(1) σ is normalized;
(2) σ is a model of S;
(3) For any x ∈ dom (σ) there exist k ∈ N and s1, . . . , sk ∈ S̊ub (S)∪priv (Sub (S) ∩ A)
such that xσ = π({s1σ, . . . , skσ}) and si 6= sj , if i 6= j and root (si) 6= · for all i.
Proposition 5. Assume we are given a normalized constraint system S and its normalized
model σ such that ∀x, y ∈ dom (σ) , x 6= y =⇒ xσ 6= yσ. Then π(H (σ)) is a conservative
model of S.
Proof. From Proposition 4 we obtain that π(H (σ)) is a normalized solution of S. By
definition, xπ(H (σ)) = π(H (xσ)). Let us take any s ∈ H (xσ) (note that s is a ground
term). Then, by definition of H (·) we have:
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• either s ∈ A. Then, by definition of H (·), s ∈ (A ∩ Sub (S)). Thus, s π(H (σ)) = s,
s ∈ S̊ub (S), s 6= · (L);
• or s = bin (π(H (t1)), π(H (t2))) and ∃u ∈ S̊ub (S) such that puσq = pbin (t1, t2)q =
bin (pt1q , pt2q). As all conditions of Lemma 15 are satisfied, ∃v ∈ Sub (u) such that
pvσq = bin (pt1q , pt2q) and v = bin (p, q) and as u ∈ S̊ub (S) then v ∈ S̊ub (S).
By Proposition 2, pv π(H (σ))q = π(H (vσ)) = π(H (pvσq)) = π(H (bin (t1, t2))) =
π({bin (π(H (t1)), π(H (t2)))}) = bin (π(H (t1)), π(H (t2))) = s. That means, ∃v ∈
S̊ub (S) , v 6= · (L) such that s = pv π(H (σ))q.
• or s = priv (π(H (t1))). In this case, as s is ground, π(H (t1)) must be an atom (we
recall that π(H (·)) transforms valid terms to valid ones), moreover, by definition of
H (·), this atom is from (A ∩ Sub (S)). Therefore, s = priv (a), where a ∈ A ∩ Sub (S)
(and of course, s 6= · (L)).
Thus, for all s ∈ H (xσ), there exists v ∈ Sub (S) ∪ priv (Sub (S) ∩ A) \ X such
that s = pv π(H (σ))q. Therefore, as xπ(H (σ)) = π(H (xσ)), we have that xπ(H (σ)) =
π({ps1 π(H (σ))q , . . . , psk π(H (σ))q}) = π({s1 π(H (σ)), . . . , sk π(H (σ))}), where s1, . . . , sk ∈
S̊ub (S) ∪ priv (Sub (S) ∩ A) and si 6= · (L) ,∀1 ≤ i ≤ k. That proves the proposition. 2
Corollary 6. Given a normalized constraint system S and its normalized model σ′ such
that x 6= y =⇒ xσ′ 6= yσ′. Then S admits a conservative solution.
3.5. Bounds on conservative solutions
To get a decidability result, we first show an upper bound on the size of a conservative
model. Then we reduce any satisfiable constraint system to another satisfiable one
that admits a conservative model (this reduction is, in fact, using one name for the
variables on which some preliminary fixed model returns equal values). Moreover the
considered conservative model of the obtained constraint system can be easily extended
to a conservative model (of the same size) of the initial constraint system. We also show
that the reduced constraint system has not a larger size than the original one. This means
that the original constraint system has a model which is bounded with regard to the size
of the constraint system. Thus, we prove the existence of a model with bounded size for
any satisfiable constraint system.
Lemma 16. For any term t and substitution σ, ∀s ∈ Sub (t) |Sub (ptσq)| ≥ |Sub (psσq)|.
Proof. From Lemma 5 we can easily obtain Sub (sσ) ⊆ Sub (tσ). Then we need to prove
that |Sub (ppq)| ≤ |Sub (pqq)|, if Sub (p) ⊆ Sub (q). The proof is mainly based on the
fact that if Sub (p) ⊆ Sub (q) then Sub (ppq) \ {ppq} ⊆ Sub (pqq). Let us consider several
cases.
• If p = q then the statement is trivial.
• If there exists v ∈ Sub (q) such that v = bin (p, p′) or v = bin (p′, p) or v = priv (p).
Then note that by definition of the normalization, since root (v) 6= ·, we have pvq ∈
Sub (pqq). Then (without loss of generality we consider only case v = bin (p, p′))
pvq = bin (ppq , pp′q) and thus ppq ∈ Sub (pvq). Therefore, (since pvq ∈ Sub (pqq))
ppq ∈ Sub (pqq) and then Sub (ppq) ⊆ Sub (pqq). From this follows |Sub (ppq)| ≤
|Sub (pqq)|.
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• Otherwise, there exists v ∈ QSub (q) such that v = · (L) and elems (p) ⊆ elems (v)
(note that v 6= p, otherwise we are in the one of the two cases above). From Lemma 2 we
have elems (ppq) ⊆ elems (pvq). Note that by definition of the normalization and since
v ∈ QSub (q) (and thus v = q or there exists v′ ∈ Sub (q) such that v′ = bin (v, p′) or
v′ = bin (p′, v) or v′ = priv (v)) we have that pvq ∈ Sub (pqq), moreover, Sub (pvq) ⊆
Sub (pqq). Then from Lemma 6 we have elems (pvq) ⊆ Sub (pqq). Thus, elems (ppq) ⊆
Sub (pqq), consequently, Sub (elems (ppq)) ⊆ Sub (pqq). Now, if elems (ppq) = {ppq},
then the statement becomes trivial. Otherwise, ppq = · (elems (ppq)), and then Sub (ppq) =
ppq∪Sub (elems (ppq)). Since we have already shown that Sub (elems (ppq)) ⊆ Sub (pqq),
to prove the statement it is enough to show that there exists p′ ∈ Sub (pqq) such that
p′ /∈ Sub (elems (ppq)). For such value we can choose p′ = pvq (pvq cannot be in
Sub (elems (ppq)), since elems (ppq) ⊆ elems (pvq) ⊆ Sub (pvq) and in the current case
root (pvq) = ·).
2
Lemma 17. Given a normalized constraint system S and its conservative model σ. Then
∀x ∈ Vars (S) ,Sub (xσ) ⊆ pSub (S)σq ∪ priv (Sub (S) ∩ A).
Proof. Given a ground substitution σ, let us define a strict total order on variables:
x @ y ⇐⇒ (|Sub (xσ)| < |Sub (yσ)|) ∨ (|Sub (xσ)| = |Sub (yσ)| ∧ x ≺ y).
By Proposition 5 for any x ∈ Vars (S) we have xσ = π({sx1σ, . . . , sxkxσ}), where
sxi ∈ (Sub (S) \ X ) ∪ priv (Sub (S) ∩ A) and sxi 6= · (L). Moreover, sxi are normalized (as
S is normalized).
Let us show that if y ∈ Vars (sxi ) for some i, then y @ x. Suppose that y ∈ Vars (sxi )
and x @ y. Then |Sub (xσ)| = |Sub (π({sx1σ, . . . , sxkxσ}))| = |Sub (p· (sx1σ, . . . , sxkxσ)q)| ≥
(by Lemma 16) ≥ |Sub (psxi σq)| > |Sub (pyσq)|, because we know that sxi = bin (p, q)
or sxi = priv (p) and y ∈ Vars (sxi ) (for example, in the first case, |Sub (psxi σq)| =
|Sub (bin (ppσq , pqσq))| = 1 + |Sub ({ppσq , pqσq})| and as y ∈ Vars ({p, q}), using
Lemma 16, we get |Sub (psxi σq)| ≥ 1 + |Sub (pyσq)|). Since |Sub (pyσq)| = |Sub (yσ)|
we have y @ x. Contradiction.
Now we show by induction the main property of this lemma.
• let x = min@(Vars (S)). Then xσ = π({sx1σ, . . . , sxkxσ}) = p· (sx1σ, . . . , sxkxσ)q and all
sxi are ground (as @y @ x). Then xσ = p· (sx1 , . . . , sxkx)q. Since sxi are normalized with
non-· root, we have that Sub (xσ) = {p· (sx1 , . . . , sxkx)q} ∪ Sub (sx1) ∪ · · · ∪ Sub (sxkx) ⊆
pSub (S)σq ∪ priv (A ∩ Sub (S)), as ∀s ∈ Sub (sxi ), s ∈ Tg and s ∈ Sub (S) or s =
priv (a) or s = a, where a ∈ Sub (S) ∩ A, therefore s = psq = sσ ∈ pSub (S)σq ∪
priv (Sub (S) ∩ A) and p· (sx1 , . . . , sxkx)q = xσ ∈ pSub (S)σq.
• Suppose, for all z @ y, Sub (zσ) ⊆ pSub (Sσ)q ∪ priv (Sub (S) ∩ A).
• Show that Sub (yσ) ⊆ Sub (Sσ) ∪ priv (Sub (S) ∩ A).
We know that yσ = π({sy1σ, . . . , s
y
kyσ}) = p· (s
y
1σ, . . . , s
y
kyσ)q and ∀z ∈ Vars (s
y
i ) , z @ y.
Then we have Sub (yσ) = {yσ} ∪ Sub (psy1σq)∪ · · · ∪ Sub (ps
y
kyσq). We know that yσ ∈
pSub (S)σq. Let us show that Sub (psyi σq) ⊆ pSub (S)σq∪priv (Sub (S) ∩ A). By The-
orems 5 and 9 we have Sub (ps
y
i σq) ⊆ pSub (s
y
i σ)q = pSub (s
y
i )σ ∪ Sub (Vars (s
y
i )σ)q =
pSub (s
y
i )σq ∪ Sub (Vars (s
y
i )σ). As s
y
i ∈ Sub (S) ∪ priv (Sub (S) ∩ A), we can see
that pSub (s
y
i )σq ⊆ pSub (S)σq ∪ priv (Sub (S) ∩ A); then from the induction hy-
pothesis and the statement proved above we have Sub (Vars (syi )σ) ⊆ pSub (S)σq ∪
priv (Sub (S) ∩ A). Thus, Sub (yσ) ⊆ pSub (S)σq ∪ priv (Sub (S) ∩ A).
2
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Proposition 7. For a normalized constraint system S that has a conservative model σ,
∀x ∈ Vars (S) , |Sub (xσ)| ≤ 2× |Sub (S)|.
Proof. As |pSub (S)σq| ≤ |Sub (S)σ| ≤ |Sub (S)|, we have that |Sub (xσ)| ≤ |pSub (S)σq∪
priv (A ∩ Sub (S))| ≤ |pSub (S)σq| + |priv (A ∩ Sub (S))| ≤ (as |pTq| ≤ |T | and |Tσ| ≤
|T |) ≤ |Sub (S)|+ |A ∩ Sub (S)| ≤ 2× |Sub (S)|; thus, |Sub (xσ)| ≤ 2× |Sub (S)|. 2
From this proposition and Corollary 6 we obtain the existence of a bounded model
for any normalized constraint system that has a model mapping different variables to
different values. We will reduce an arbitrary constraint system to the already studied
case. The target properties are stated in Proposition 8 and Corollary 9.
Lemma 18. Given any constraint system S and any substitution θ such that dom (θ) =
Vars (S) and img (θ) ⊆ dom (θ), then |Sub (Sθ)| ≤ |Sub (S)|.
Proof. By Lemma 5, |Sub (Sθ)| = |Sub (S) θ∪Sub (Vars (S) θ)|, but Vars (S) θ ⊆ dom (θ) =
Vars (S) (Vars (S) θ consists only of variables), and then Sub (Vars (S) θ) = Vars (S) θ. As
Vars (S) ⊆ Sub (S), we have Sub (S) θ ∪ Sub (Vars (S) θ) = Sub (S) θ. Thus, |Sub (Sθ)| =
|Sub (S) θ| ≤ |Sub (S)|. 2
Definition 3.15. Let σ and δ be two substitutions. Then σ[δ] is a substitution such that
dom (σ[δ]) = dom (δ) and for all x ∈ dom (σ[δ]), xσ[δ] = (xδ)σ.
Lemma 19. Let θ and σ be two substitutions such that img (θ) = dom (σ), dom (σ) ⊆
dom (θ). Then, for any term t, (tθ)σ = tσ[θ].
Proof. When we apply θ to t, every variable x of t such that x ∈ dom (θ) is replaced by
xθ; then we apply σ to tθ: every variable y of tθ is replaced by yσ, thus, every variable x
from dom (θ) will be replaced by (xθ)σ (as img (θ) = dom (σ)); and no other variables
will be replaced (as dom (σ) ⊆ dom (θ)). This corresponds with the definition of σ[θ]. 2
Proposition 8. Given a satisfiable constraint system S there exists a model σ of S such
that ∀x ∈ dom (σ) , |Sub (xσ)| ≤ 2× |Sub (pSq)|
Proof. Given a normalized model σ′ of S we build a substitution θ that maps different
variables whose σ′-values are equal to a single new variable. In this way we obtain a new
constraint system pSθq and its normalized model. Then we apply Corollary 6 and get a
conservative model σ′′ of pSθq. By applying Proposition 7 we get a bound on the size for
this model. On the other hand , we use Lemma 19 to show that σ′′[θ] is a model of pSq.
Then, using the obtained bound and Lemma 18, we show the existence of a model with
the desired property. The detailed proof is given in Appendix B.6 2
Corollary 9. A constraint system S is satisfiable iff there exists a normalized model of
S defined on Vars (S) which maps a variable to a ground term in T (A ∩QSub (pSq) , ∅)
of size ≤ 2× |Sub (S)|.
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Using this result we get Algorithm 1 for solving constraint systems:
Algorithm 1: Solving constraint systems
Input: A constraint system S = {Ei  ti}i=1,...,n
Output: A model σ, if it exists else ⊥
1 Guess for every variable x of S a value for xσ of size ≤ 2× |Sub (S)|;
2 if σ satisfies Ei  ti for all i = 1, . . . , n then return σ else return ⊥
Proposition 10. Algorithm 1 is correct.
Proof. Let σ be an output of Algorithm 1. Then σ is a ground substitution and σ satisfies
all constraints from S ′ and therefore, satisfies all constraints from S . This means, σ is a
model of S. 2
Proposition 11. Algorithm 1 is complete.
Proof. Suppose S is satisfiable. Then, by Corollary 9, there exists a guess of values for
every element of Vars (S) with size ≤ 2× |Sub (S)| which defines a model σ of S. Thus
Algorithm 1 will return this σ. 2
4. Complexity analysis
In this section we study the complexity of the proposed algorithm. First, we expose a
representation of constraint systems to justify the selected measure for algorithm inputs.
Then, we remark that the normalization algorithm is polynomial and we show that the
derivability algorithm is polynomial too. As a consequence the algorithm for solving
general constraint systems within the DY+ACI model is in NP . Since constraint solving
is known to be NP -hard for well-formed constraints, we deduce it is NP -complete for
general constraints.
To determine the algorithm complexity we first define a reasonable measure for inputs.
Remark that |Sub (·)| does not approximate polynomially the number of bits needed to
write its argument (a term, a set of terms, or a constraint system). As a measure for terms
and sets of terms we will use |Sub (·)| + |E (·)|, where E (·) is a set of edges in the DAG-
representation of its argument. For the size of a system of constraints S = {Ei  ti}i=1,...,n
we will use n× |Sub (S)|+ |E (S)| . The justification is given below.
Definition 4.1. The DAG-representation of a constraint system S = {Ei  ti}i=1,...,n is
a tagged graph with labeled edges G = 〈V,E, tag〉 (V is a set of vertices and E is a set of
edges; tag is a tagging function defined on V) such that:
• there exists a bijection f : V 7→ Sub (S);
• ∀v ∈ V tag (v) = 〈s,m〉, where
· s = root (f(v));
· m is a 2n-bit integer, where m[2i− 1] = 1 if and only if f(v) ∈ Ei and
m[2i] = 1 if and only if f(v) = ti.
• v1
1−→ v2 ∈ E if and only if ∃p ∈ T : (∃bin : f(v1) = bin (f(v2), p))∨f(v1) = priv (f(v2));
• v1
2−→ v2 ∈ E if and only if ∃p ∈ T : ∃bin : f(v1) = bin (p, f(v2));
• v1
i−→ v2 ∈ E if and only if f(v1) = · (L) ∧ L[i] = f(v2);
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Figure 4. DAG-representation of constraint system S
Example 7. A constraint system
S =

{enc (a, x) ,pair (b, enc (a, a)) , c} a
{priv (b) , c} y
{enc (sig (a,priv (c)) , y) , aenc (x, b)} pair (enc (a, x) , c)
will be represented as shown 3 in Figure 4. The nodes of this graph represent the elements
from Sub (S) by indicating their root symbols (first part of their tags) and pointers to
their children.
The given representation takes less than P (n × |V(S)| + |E (S)|) bits, where n is
the number of constraints, V(·) is the set of nodes and E(·) is the set of edges in the
DAG-representation, and P is some polynomial with non-negative coefficients. As we
have a bijection between V(S) and Sub (S), we obtain |V(S)| = |Sub (S)|. Therefore we
will estimate the complexity of our algorithm by taking n × |Sub (S)| + |E (S)| as the
measure of the constraint system S.
The DAG-representation of a term t has a structure similar to the one of a constraint
system except that the second part of the tagging function is dropped: we need only
root (f(v)) as a node’s tag. The size of this representation will be polynomially bounded
by |Sub (t)|+ |E (t)|. Thus we give the following definition:
Definition 4.2. The measure of a term t is: measure (t) = |Sub (t)|+ |E (t)|. The measure
of a constraint system S = {Ei  ti}i=1,...,n is: measure (S) = n× |Sub (S)|+ |E (S)|.
3 Label “1” (resp.“2”) of an edge is represented by a left (resp. right) side of its source node
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We remark that the given measure is not the exact number of bits needed to write
the argument down (this value involves a logarithm factor and would complexify the
notation), but is a polynomial approximation of it which is sufficient for our purpose.
Note that for normalized terms and constraint systems the number of edges in their
DAG-representation are polynomially bounded w.r.t. the number of vertices:
Lemma 20. For any normalized term t, |E (t)| < (|Sub (t)|)2. For any normalized
constraint system S, |E (S)| < (|Sub (S)|)2.
Proof. Since the term (resp. constraint system) is normalized, there are at most two
edges between two nodes. A binary node has at most two outgoing edges per destination
node, an unary node — one, and ·-node has at most one outgoing edge per destination
node because of normalization. Therefore, as the graph is directed and acyclic, with at
most two edges between two nodes, we have less than |Sub (x)| × (|Sub (x)| − 1) edges
(where x is a term t or a constraint system S). 2
4.1. Satisfiability of a general DY+ACI constraint system is in NP
Lemma 21. The normalization of a term t can be done in polynomial time on measure (t).
The same holds for a constraint system S: normalization can be done in polynomial time
on measure (S).
Proof idea (for the case of terms). The algorithm of term normalization works bottom-
up by flattening nested ACI-sets, sorting children of ACI-set nodes, merging duplicated
nodes while removing unnecessary duplicating edges and removing nodes without incoming
edges (except the root-node of t). 2
Lemma 22. For a term t, |Sub (ptq)| ≤ |Sub (t)|; for a set of terms T , |Sub (pTq)| ≤
|Sub (T )|; for a constraint system S, |Sub (pSq)| ≤ |Sub (S)|.
The proof for the case of terms is given in Appendix B.5. 2
Proposition 12. Satisfiability of general DY+ACI constraint systems is in NP.
Proof. Algorithm 1 returns a solution if it exists. We have to show that the verification
of this solution is polynomial with regard to the input. To do this, we will normalize Sσ
and then apply the result described in § 3.3 for checking derivability. Using the fact that
|Sub (xσ)| ≤ 2× |Sub (S)| and normalization is polynomial, checking the validity of terms
in pSσq and the derivability, we can get an upper bound of the execution time that is
polynomial on measure (S). The details of the proof are given in Appendix B.3. 2
On the other hand, we can reuse a technique presented in Rusinowitch and Turuani
(2003) to show that the satisfiability of a constraint system is an NP -hard problem.
The authors encode the 3-SAT problem into an insecurity problem of a single-session
sequential protocol. Because the steps of the protocol are linearly ordered, finding an
attack is reduced to the satisfiability problem of a single well-formed constraint system.
Since the class of constraint systems we consider contains the case presented in this work,
we can conclude to the NP -hardness of our problem. Thus,
Theorem 1. Satisfiability of general DY+ACI constraint systems is NP -complete.
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Figure 5. Proof Plan
5. Satisfiability of general DY constraint systems
The constraint solving algorithm for the DY+ACI theory can be adapted to the
classical DY case. But we cannot apply it directly, as a derived solution may contain an
ACI symbol. Thus, we need to do some more work to prove the decidability of the DY
case. The scheme we follow to solve a constraint system within the DY deduction system
is shown in Figure 5.
First, we show that if a constraint system is satisfiable within DY, then it is satisfiable
within DY+ACI (Proposition 13). Second, as we know, we can find a model of a given
constraint system within DY+ACI. Third, we transform the model obtained from previous
step (which is in DY+ACI) in such a way, that the resulting substitution will be a model
of the initial constraint system within DY (Theorem 2). The transformation δ to be used is
simple: we replace any ACI list of terms · (t1, . . . , tn) by nested pairs: pair (t1,pair (..., tn)).
Note that this transformation has a linear complexity and the transformed model will have
a DAG-size not more than twice bigger than the initial one. This keeps the complexity in
NP , for the problem of satisfiability of general constraint system within the DY model.
Definition 5.1. We define a replacement δ (t) : Tg 7→ Tg in the following way:
δ (t) =

t, if t ∈ X ∪ A;
bin (δ (p) , δ (q)) , if t = bin (p, q) ,
priv (δ (p)) , if t = priv (p) ;
δ (t1) , if t = · (t1) ;
pair (δ (t1) , δ (· (t2, . . . , tm))) , if t = · (t1, . . . , tm) ,m > 1;
Definition 5.2. Given a substitution σ. Then δ (σ) = {x→ δ (xσ)}x∈dom(σ). For T ⊆ Tg,
δ (T ) = {δ (t) : t ∈ T}.
To recall the Dolev-Yao deduction system (DY), see Table 1.
Definition 5.3. A constraint system S is standard if for all s ∈ Sub (S) root (s) 6= ·. The
definition is extended in natural way to terms, sets of terms and substitutions.
We can redefine the notion of derivation for Dolev-Yao deduction system in a natural
way, and denote it as DerDY .
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Lemma 23. Any standard constraint system is normalized.
Lemma 24. Let t be a standard term and σ be a normalized substitution. Then tσ is
normalized.
Proposition 13. If a standard constraint system S has a model σ within the DY deduction
system, then S has a model within the DY+ACI deduction system.
Proof. It is enough to consider the same model σ in DY+ACI. As Sσ is normalized and
as DY+ACI includes all the rules from DY, it is easy to show using the same derivation
that proves σ to be a model in DY, that σ remains a model of S in DY+ACI. 2
Next we show that we can build a model of a constraint system within DY from a
model of this constraint system within DY+ACI.
Proposition 14. For any DY+ACI rule l1, . . . , lk → r, if li are normalized for all
i = 1, . . . , k then δ (r) ∈ DerDY ({δ (l1) , . . . , δ (lk)}).
Proof. Let us consider all possible rules:
(1) t1, t2 → pbin (t1, t2)q for bin 6= sig.
As t1 and t2 are normalized, then pbin (t1, t2)q = bin (t1, t2). We can see, that
δ (bin (t1, t2)) = bin (δ (t1) , δ (t2)) ∈ DerDY ({δ (t1) , δ (t2)}).
(2) t1,priv (t2)→ psig (t1,priv (t2))q.
As t1 and priv (t2) are normalized, then psig (t1,priv (t2))q = sig (t1,priv (t2)). We
can see that δ (sig (t1,priv (t2))) = sig (δ (t1) , δ (priv (t2))) = sig (δ (t1) ,priv (δ (t2))) ∈
DerDY ({δ (t1) ,priv (δ (t2))}), but priv (δ (t2)) = δ (priv (t2)).
(3) t1, . . . , tm → p· (t1, . . . , tm)q.
The fact that elems (p· (t1, . . . , tm)q) =
⋃
i=1,...,m elems (ti) follows from ti = ptiq
(for all i) and Lemma 4.
We can (DY)-derive from {δ (ti)} any term in δ (elems (ti)) trivially if ti 6= · (L)
and by applying rules pair (s1, s2)
DY−−→ s1 and pair (s1, s2)
DY−−→ s2 otherwise (by
induction on the size of ti).
One can observe, that δ (t) is a pairing (composition of pair (·, ·) operator with
itself) of δ (elems (t)) (by definition of δ (·) and normalization function). And then,
as δ (t) is limited in size, we can (DY)-derive δ (t) from δ (elems (t)) by iterative use
of rule s1, s2
DY−−→ pair (s1, s2), if needed.
Thus, first we can derive δ (elems (ti)) for all i, and then rebuild (derive with
composition rules) δ (p· (t1, . . . , tm)q).
(4) enc (t1, t2) , pt2q→ pt1q.
Since enc (t1, t2) is normalized, we have t1 = pt1q and t2 = pt2q. Thus, δ (t1) ∈
DerDY ({enc (δ (t1) , δ (t2)) , δ (t2)}) and this is what we need, as δ (enc (t1, t2)) =
enc (δ (t1) , δ (t2)).
(5) pair (t1, t2)→ pt1q. Similar case.
(6) pair (t1, t2)→ pt2q. Similar case.
(7) aenc (t1, t2) , ppriv (t2)q→ pt1q. Similar case. Note, that δ (priv (t2)) = priv (δ (t2))
(8) · (t1, . . . , tm)→ ptiq.
As said above, δ (elems (· (t1, . . . , tm))) ⊆ DerDY ({δ (· (t1, . . . , tm))}); and as
δ (elems (ti)) ⊆ δ (elems (· (t1, . . . , tm))), we can (DY)-derive (by composition rules)
δ (ti) from δ (elems (ti)).
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Proposition 15. Given a standard constraint system S and a normalized model σ of S
in DY+ACI then, for any t ∈ Sub (S) we have δ (tσ) = tδ (σ).
Proof. The proof is by induction as in Proposition 2.
• Let |Sub (t)| = 1. Then either t ∈ A or t ∈ X . Both are trivial cases.
• Assume that for some k ≥ 1 if |Sub (t)| ≤ k, then δ (tσ) = tδ (σ).
• Show, that for t such that |Sub (t)| ≥ k + 1, where t = bin (p, q) or t = priv (p) and
|Sub (p)| ≤ k and |Sub (q)| ≤ k, statement δ (tσ) = tδ (σ) is still true. We have:
· either t = bin (p, q). As δ (bin (p, q)σ) = δ (bin (pσ, qσ)) =
bin (δ (pσ) , δ (qσ)) = bin (pδ (σ) , qδ (σ)) = bin (p, q) δ (σ).
· or t = priv (p). In this case the proof can be done by analogy with previous one.
Remark: as S is standard, t 6= · (L).
2
Theorem 2. Let S = {Ei  ti}i=1,...,n be a standard constraint system and σ be a
normalized model in DY+ACI. Then δ (σ) is a model in DY of S.
Proof. Let E  t be any element of S. As σ is a model of S, then ptσq ∈ Der (pEσq). As
σ is normalized and S is standard, using Lemma 24 we have ptσq = tσ and pEσq = Eσ.
Then, tσ ∈ Der (Eσ). That means there exists a DY+ACI derivation D = {A0, . . . , Ak}
such that A0 = Eσ and tσ ∈ Ak.
By Proposition 14 and Lemma 14 (which also works for DY case) we can easily prove
that if k > 0, δ (Aj) ⊆ DerDY (δ (Aj−1)) , j = 1, . . . , k. Note, that δ (A) is a set of standard
terms (and thus, normalized) for any set of terms A. Then, applying the transitivity
property of DerDY (·) (Lemma 14 for DY) k times, we have that δ (Ak) ⊆ DerDY (δ (A0)).
In the case where k = 0, the statement δ (Ak) ⊆ DerDY (δ (A0)) is also true.
Using Proposition 15 we have that δ (A0) = δ (Eσ) = Eδ (σ), as E ⊆ QSub (S). The
same for t: δ (tσ) = tδ (σ), and as tσ ∈ Ak, we have tδ (σ) ∈ δ (Ak).
Thus, we have that tδ (σ) ∈ δ (Ak) ⊆ DerDY (δ (A0)) = DerDY (Eδ (σ)), that means
δ (σ) DY-satisfies any constraint of S. 2
We present an example illustrating the theorem.
Example 8. Let us consider a standard constraint system similar to Example 5.
S =
 enc (x, a) ,pair (c, a)  bpair (x, c)  a
 ,
Using Algorithm 1, we can get a model of S within DY+ACI, as in Example 6, σ =
{x 7→ · (a, b, c)}. Then, by applying the transformation δ (·), we will get σ′ = δ (σ) =
{x 7→ pair (a,pair (b, c))}. We can see that σ′ is also a model of S within DY (as it was
proven in Theorem 2).
Corollary 16 (of Theorem 2 and Proposition 13). A standard constraint system S is
satisfiable within DY iff it is satisfiable within DY+ACI.
Theorem 3. Satisfiability of DY constraint systems is in NP .
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Proof. It is a consequence of Proposition 12 and Corollary 16.
2
Then, since the problem is known to be NP -hard Rusinowitch and Turuani (2003)
for the particular case of well-formed constraints, we obtain the NP -hardness and thus,
NP -completeness:
Corollary 17. Satisfiability of DY constraint systems is NP-complete.
6. Conclusions
In this work we have presented a decision algorithm for the satisfiability of general
constraint systems within Dolev-Yao deduction system possibly extended with an ACI
symbol that can be used to represent sets of terms. The complexity of the algorithm was
proved to be in NP .
We have also given two applications of the presented result: protocol insecurity with
non-communicating intruders and discovering XML-based attacks. Moreover, recent works
Mödersheim et al. (2013); Kassem et al. (2013) have shown the interest of general intruder
constraints for analyzing security problems of mobile code encountered in web-browsers,
smartphones, and virtualized infrastructures. In this approach, an attacker can construct
new processes from his knowledge by using the constructors of the ambient calculus, in
the same way as a Dolev Yao intruder constructs messages in protocol verification.
As future works one may consider the verification of equivalence properties such
as anonymity or secrecy of a ballot in vote. For instance one has to show that there
is no action for an attacker that makes distinguishable two protocol executions with
different identities or vote values. In presence of multiple intruders this may require to
extend a decision procedure for trace equivalences Baudet (2005) using our techniques.
Another challenging extension of our result would be a decision procedure for general
constraints with negation. Negation constraints are particularly useful to model non-
disclosure policies when generating distributed orchestration of secure services, following
the approach introduced in Avanesov et al. (2012).
A. General constraints for subterm theories
We demonstrate here that the well-formedness property is a strong restriction for
constraint systems: in some theories satisfiability of well-formed constraints may be
decidable, while satisfiability of general constraints may be undecidable.
We define a subterm deduction system to be a finite set of rules of the following forms:
(1) composition rules: for all public functional symbols f , x1, . . . , xk → f(x1, . . . , xk)
(2) decomposition rules: t1, . . . , tm → s, where s is a subterm of ti for some i.
We show that the satisfiability of a constraint system within a subterm deduction
system is undecidable in general. More precisely:
Instance: a subterm deduction system D, a constraint system C.
Question: is C satisfiable?
To show this, we reduce the halting problem of a Deterministic Turing Machine (TM)
M that works on a single tape. We consider the tape alphabet Γ = {0, 1, [}, and [ is the
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blank symbol. The states of the TM M are in a finite set Q = {q1, q2, . . . , qn}. W.l.o.g.
we can assume that q1 (resp. qn) is the unique initial (resp. accepting) state.
In order to represent Turing machine configurations as terms we shall introduce a set
of variables X and an alphabet F
F := {0, 1, [,⊥} ∪Q,
where F \ {⊥} are public functional symbols.
The TM configuration with tape ⊥ abcde ⊥, (where ⊥ is an endmarker), with
symbol d under the head, and state q will be represented by the following term of
q(c(b(a(⊥), d(e(⊥), x) where x ∈ X and a, b, c, d, e ∈ {0, 1, [}.
The composition rules we consider for the TM are u → f(u) for each f ∈ {0, 1, [}
and u, v, w → q(u, v, w) for each q ∈ Q. For each TM transition of M we will intro-
duce some decomposition deduction rule that can be applied on a term representation
q(u, v, q′(u′, v′, x′)) iff the transition can be applied to a configuration represented by
q(u, v, ) and generate a configuration represented by q′(u′, v′, ).
For each TM instruction of type: “In state q reading a go to state q′ and write b”, we
define the following rule for a, b ∈ {0, 1, [}:
q(u, a(v), q′(u, b(v), x))→ q′(u, b(v), x).
For each instruction of type: “In state q reading a go to state q′ and move right”, we
define the following rules for a ∈ {0, 1, [} :
q(u, a(v), q′(a(u), v, x))→ q′(a(u), v, x).
A rule is for extending the tape on the right when needed:
q(u,⊥, q′(u, [(⊥), x))→ q′(u, [(⊥), x).
For each instruction of type: “In state q reading a go to state q′ and move left”, we
define the following rules for a ∈ {0, 1, [} for each b ∈ {0, 1, [}:
q(b(u), a(v), q′(u, b(a(v)), x))→ q′(u, b(a(v)), x).
A rule is for extending the tape on the left when needed:
q(⊥, v, q′(⊥, [(v), x))→ q′(⊥, [(v), x).
The resulting deduction system DM is obviously a subterm deduction system.
Let us consider a constraint S to be solved modulo DM :
{q1(⊥,⊥, x)} qn(⊥,⊥, y).
This constraint is satisfiable iff there is a sequence of transitions of M from a configu-
ration with initial state q1 and empty tape to a configuration with an accepting state and
empty tape. Hence the constraint solving problem is undecidable.
Let us recall the definition of some properties of constraint systems. These two properties
are natural for modeling standard security protocols:
Variable origination: ∀i, ∀x ∈ Vars (Ei) ∃j < i x ∈ Vars (tj),
Monotonicity: j < i =⇒ Ej ⊆ Ei.
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Note that {{q1(⊥,⊥, x)} qn(⊥,⊥, y)} is obviously monotonic.
As a consequence, satisfiability of monotonic constraint systems (but without variable
origination) is undecidable. Here is another constraint system, where variable origination
is satisfied, but monotony is not. It can be used for reducing the halting problem again:
{{⊥} x, {q1(⊥,⊥, x)} qn(⊥,⊥, y)}
As a consequence, satisfiability of constraint systems with variable origination (but
without monotonicity) is undecidable.
We should note by contrast (see Baudet (2005)) that constraint solving in subterm
convergent theories is decidable if the constraint system S = {Ei  ti}i=1,...,n satisfies
both variable origination and monotonicity. Moreover, the problem of constraint system
satisfiability for a subterm deduction system encoding a Deterministic Turing Machine as
above can be reduced to the problem of constraint system satisfiability within a subterm
convergent equational theory.
If we consider a Universal Turing Machine 4 with a single final state qn and that halts
with an empty tape if and only if the Turing Machine with the given code terminates
on the given input, then by reusing the encoding above we will obtain a fixed subterm
deduction system DU for which the following problem is undecidable:
Instance: A constraint system C.
Question: is C satisfiable within DU?
This is due to the fact that the halting problem of a TM with code TMcode on input
Input is encoded into solving the following constraint:
{q1(⊥, TMcode+ Input, x)} qn(⊥,⊥, y).
B. Proofs
B.1. Proof of Lemma 12
By induction on |Sub (t)|.
• |Sub (t)| = 1, implies t = a ∈ A and then elems (a) = {a}, i.e. the equality becomes
trivial.
• Suppose that for any t : |Sub (t)| < k (k > 1), H (t) =
⋃
p∈elems(t)H (p) holds.
• Given a term t : |Sub (t)| = k, k > 1. We should prove H (t) =
⋃
p∈elems(t)H (p).
· t = priv (t1) or t = bin (p, q). In both cases, elems (t) = {t}, and thus, he equality is
trivial.
· t = · (L). Note that ∀s ∈ L, |Sub (s)| < k. Then, on one hand, H (· (L)) =⋃
p∈LH (p) = (by induction hypothesis) =
⋃
p∈L
⋃
p′∈elems(p)H (p
′). On the other
hand,
⋃
p∈elems(·(L))H (p) =
⋃
p∈
⋃
p′∈L
elems(p′)H (p) =
⋃
p′∈L
⋃
p∈elems(p′)H (p). Thus,
H (t) =
⋃
p∈elems(t)H (p).
4 Thanks to R. Küsters for the idea.
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B.2. Proof of Lemma 6
First we prove that elems (t) ⊆ QSub (t). We use a proof by induction on |Sub (t)|.
• If root (t) 6= ·, then elems (t) = {t} ⊆ QSub (t). This case includes all t such that
|Sub (t)| = 1. Thus we need to consider only t = · (L).
• Suppose that for any t : |Sub (t)| < k (k ≥ 1), the statement holds.
• If for some t we have |Sub (t)| = k, k > 1, then elems (t) =
⋃
p∈L elems (p) and
QSub (t) = {t}
⋃
p∈L QSub (p). And since |Sub (p)| < k using the induction supposition
we obtain the wanted statement.
Now we show that QSub (t) ⊆ Sub (t). Again, applying proof by induction on |Sub (t)|
we have:
• If |Sub (t)| = 1, then QSub (t) = Sub (t) = {t}.
• Suppose that for any t : |Sub (t)| < k (k ≥ 1), the statement holds.
• If for some t we have |Sub (t)| = k, k > 1, then
· t = bin (t1, t2).Then QSub (t) = {t} ∪ QSub (t1) ∪ QSub (t2) and Sub (t) = {t} ∪
Sub (t1) ∪ Sub (t2), where max{|Sub (t1)|, |Sub (t2)|} < k. And then using induction
supposition we can conclude for this case.
· t = priv (t1). Proof is similar to one for the case above.
· t = · (t1, . . . , tm). Then we have QSub (t) = {t}∪
⋃
p∈elems(t1,...,tm) QSub (p) ⊆ (using
the already proved part of the property) ⊆ {t} ∪
⋃
p∈QSub({t1,...,tm}) QSub (p) =
(as QSub (QSub (t)) = QSub (t)) = {t} ∪
⋃
p∈{t1,...,tm}QSub (p) ⊆ (using induction
supposition, as ∀i |Sub (ti)| < k) ⊆ {t} ∪
⋃
p∈{t1,...,tm} Sub (p) = Sub (t).
B.3. Proof of Proposition 12
As was stated before, the measure of the problem input is measure (S) = n×|Sub (S)|+
|E (S)|, where S = {Ei  ti}i=1,...,n.
Algorithm 1 returns a normalized proof σ for the decision problem if it exists. Moreover,
|Sub (xσ)| ≤ 2× |Sub (S)| for any x ∈ Vars (S).
First, we will normalize Sσ. From Lemma 21 follows, that we can do it for the time
Tpq ≤ Ppq(measure (Sσ)), where Ppq is some polynomial with non-negative coefficients of
some degree m′′ > 0.
From § 3.3 we know that checking the derivability of a normalized ground term g from a
set of normalized ground terms G takes a polynomial time (depending on |Sub (G ∪ {g})|).
That is, there exists a polynomial Pg with non-negative coefficients, such that the number
of operations (execution time) to verify the derivability (g from G) will be limited by
Pg(|Sub (G ∪ {g})|). Then the execution time for checking a set of ground constraints
{Gi  gi}i=1,...,n will be limited by
∑n
i=1 Pg(|Sub (Gi ∪ {gi})|).
To prove that the algorithm is in NP we need to show that the execution time for
checking a solution is polynomially limited by the input measure, i.e. there exists a
polynomial P , such that the execution time does not exceed O(P (n× |Sub (S)|+ |E (S)|))
steps.
In our case, the execution time T of a check will be T = Tpq + Tval + Tg, where
Tval is the time needed to check the validity of terms in Sσ, and Tg is the time needed
for checking ground derivability of Sσ: Tg ≤
∑n
i=1 Pg(|Sub (p(Ei ∪ {ti})σq)|). As Pg is
a polynomial, let us say, of degree m′ > 0, with non-negative coefficients, we can use
the fact that for any positive integers x1, . . . , xk we have
∑k
i=1 Pg(xi) ≤ Pg(
∑k
i=1 xi).
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Then we have Tg ≤ Pg(
∑n
i=1|Sub (p(Ei ∪ {ti})σq)|) and by Lemma 22 we have Tg ≤
Pg(
∑n
i=1|Sub ((Ei ∪ {ti})σ)|); using the same lemma, we have
Tg ≤ Pg
(
n∑
i=1
(
|Sub (Ei ∪ {ti})|+ |Sub
(⋃
x
xσ
)
|
))
≤
≤ Pg
(
n∑
i=1
(
|Sub (Ei)|+ |Sub (ti)|+
∑
x
|Sub (xσ)|
))
≤
≤ Pg
(
n∑
i=1
(2× |Sub (S)|) + n×
∑
x
(|Sub (xσ)|)
)
≤
≤ Pg
(
2× n× |Sub (S)|+ n×
∑
x
(2× |Sub (S)|)
)
≤
≤ Pg
(
2× n× |Sub (S)|+ 2× n× (|Sub (S)|)2
)
≤
≤ Pg
(
4× n× (|Sub (S)|)2
)
≤ Pg
(
4× (n× |Sub (S)|+ |E (S)|)2
)
=
= O
(
(measure (S))2m
′)
.
On the other hand, let us consider Tpq. We have Tpq ≤ Ppq(n× |Sub (Sσ)|+ |E (Sσ)|).
One can see that the number of edges in DAG-representation of Sσ (where every variable
x of S is replaced by xσ) will not exceed the number of edges in S plus the number of
edges of all xσ: |E (Sσ)| ≤ |E (S)|+
∑
x∈Vars(S)|E (xσ)|. And since σ is normalized, we
can use Lemma 20: Tpq ≤ Ppq(n× |Sub (Sσ)|+ |E (S)|+
∑
x∈Vars(S)(|Sub (xσ)|)2).
Then, using Lemma 5 we obtain Sub (Sσ) = Sub (S)σ ∪ Sub (Vars (S)σ), and thus,
|Sub (Sσ)| ≤ |Sub (S)σ| +
∑
x∈Vars(S)|Sub (xσ)|. From ∀T ⊆ T , |Tσ| ≤ |T | follows
|Sub (S)σ| ≤ |Sub (S)|. Since |Sub (xσ)| ≤ 2×|Sub (S)| and |Vars (S)| ≤ |Sub (S)|, we ob-
tain |Sub (Sσ)| ≤ |Sub (S)|+2×(|Sub (S)|)2. In the same way,
∑
x∈Vars(S)(|Sub (xσ)|)2 ≤
|Sub (S)| × (2 × |Sub (S)|)2. Therefore, Tpq ≤ Ppq(n × (|Sub (S)| + 2 × (|Sub (S)|)2) +
|E (S)|+ |Sub (S)| × (2× |Sub (S)|)2) = O
(
(measure (S))3m′′
)
.
Note that once Sσ is normalized, the validity can be checked in linear time Tval =
O(measure (Sσ)). Using the same reasoning as for Tpq, we obtain Tval = O(measure (S)
3
).
Summing up, T = O
(
(measure (S))3m
′′
+ (measure (S))2m
′
+ (measure (S))3
)
. This
shows that checking a solution returned by the algorithm takes polynomial time, giving
the expected complexity.
B.4. Proof of Proposition 3
Let us consider all the cases of DY+ACI rules:
• t1, t2 → ppair (t1, t2)q We have two cases:
· ∃u ∈ S̊ub (S) such that ppair (t1, t2)q = puσq. Then we have π(H (ppair (t1, t2)q)) =
π(H (pair (pt1q , pt2q))) = π({pair (π(H (pt1q)), π(H (pt2q)))}) =
ppair (π(H (t1)), π(H (t2)))q and then π(H (ppair (t1, t2)q)) ∈
Der ({π(H (t1)), π(H (t2))}).
· @u ∈ S̊ub (S) such that ppair (t1, t2)q = puσq. Then (by definition, Lemma 13 and
Lemma 10) π(H (ppair (t1, t2)q)) = π(H (pt1q) ∪H (pt2q)) ∈ Der (pH (t1) ∪H (t2)q).
By Lemma 10, pH (t1)q ⊆ Der ({π(H (t1))}) and pH (t2)q ⊆ Der ({π(H (t2))}), then
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by Lemma 14, pH (t1)q ∪ pH (t2)q ⊆ Der ({π(H (t1))} ∪ {π(H (t2))}). Now, by ap-
plying Lemma 14, we have π(H (ppair (t1, t2)q)) ∈ Der ({π(H (t1))} ∪ {π(H (t2))}).
So, in this case π(H (r)) ∈ Der ({π(H (l1)), π(H (l2))}).
• t1, t2 → penc (t1, t2)q. Proof of this case can be done by analogy of previous one.
• {t1, t2} → paenc (t1, t2)q. The same.
• t1,priv (t2)→ psig (t1,priv (t2))q.
· ∃u ∈ S̊ub (S) such that psig (t1,priv (t2))q = puσq. Then
π(H (psig (t1,priv (t2))q)) = π(H (sig (t1,priv (t2)))) =
π({sig (π(H (pt1q)), π(H (ppriv (t2)q)))}) = psig (π(H (t1)),priv (π(H (t2))))q and
then π(H (psig (t1,priv (t2))q)) ∈ Der ({π(H (t1)), π(H (priv (t2)))}) (as
π(H (priv (t2))) = priv (π(H (t2)))).
· @u ∈ S̊ub (S) such that psig (t1,priv (t2))q = puσq. This case can be proved in
similar way as done for {t1, t2} → ppair (t1, t2)q.
• t1, . . . , tm → p· (t1, . . . , tm)q.
On one hand, π(H (p· (t1, . . . , tm)q)) = π(H (· (t1, . . . , tm))) = π(H (t1)∪· · ·∪H (tm)) ∈
Der (pH (t1) ∪ · · · ∪H (tm)q). On the other hand, pH (ti)q ⊆ Der ({π(H (ti))}). And
thus, by Lemma 14, π(H (p· (t1, . . . , tm)q)) ∈ Der ({π(H (t1)), . . . , π(H (tm))}).
• enc (t1, t2) , pt2q → pt1q. Here we have to show that π(H (pt1q)) is derivable from
{π(H (enc (t1, t2))), π(H (pt2q))}. Consider two cases:
· ∃u ∈ S̊ub (S) such that penc (t1, t2)q = puσq.
Then π(H (enc (t1, t2))) = enc (π(H (t1)), π(H (t2))), and π(H (pt1q)) = π(H (t1)) ∈
Der ({enc (π(H (t1)), π(H (t2))) , pπ(H (pt2q))q}).
· @u ∈ S̊ub (S) such that penc (t1, t2)q = puσq.
Then π(H (enc (t1, t2))) = π(H (t1)∪H (t2)). From Lemma 10, we have pH (t1) ∪H (t2)q ⊆
Der ({π(H (enc (t1, t2)))}), thus pH (t1)q ⊆ Der ({π(H (enc (t1, t2)))}). And then, by
Lemma 10 we have that π(H (t1)) ∈ Der (pH (t1)q). Therefore, by Lemma 13 and
Lemma 14, we have π(H (pt1q)) = π(H (t1)) ∈ Der (π(H (enc (t1, t2)))).
• aenc (t1, t2) , ppriv (t2)q → pt1q. Here we have to show that π(H (pt1q)) is derivable
from {π(H (aenc (t1, t2))), π(H (ppriv (t2)q))}. Consider two cases:
· ∃u ∈ S̊ub (S) such that paenc (t1, t2)q = puσq.
Then π(H (aenc (t1, t2))) = aenc (π(H (t1)), π(H (t2))), and then π(H (pt1q)) = π(H (t1)) ∈
Der ({aenc (π(H (t1)), π(H (t2))) , ppriv (π(H (t2)))q}). Meanwhile,
π(H (ppriv (t2)q)) = π(H (priv (t2))) = π({priv (π(H (t2)))}) = ppriv (π(H (t2)))q.
· @u ∈ QSub (S) such that paenc (t1, t2)q = puσq. Then
π(H (aenc (t1, t2))) = π(H (t1) ∪H (t2)). By Lemma 10 we have pH (t1) ∪H (t2)q ⊆
Der ({π(H (aenc (t1, t2)))}), thus pH (t1)q ⊆ Der ({π(H (aenc (t1, t2)))}). And then,
by Lemma 10 we have that π(H (t1)) ∈ Der (pH (t1)q). Therefore, by Lemma 13 and
Lemma 14, π(H (pt1q)) = π(H (t1)) ∈ Der (π(H (aenc (t1, t2)))).
• pair (t1, t2)→ pt1q. Here, as usual, we consider two cases:
· ∃u ∈ S̊ub (S) such that ppair (t1, t2)q = puσq.
Then π(H (pair (t1, t2))) = pair (π(H (t1)), π(H (t2))) and then π(H (pt1q)) = pπ(H (t1))q ∈
Der ({π(H (pair (t1, t2)))}).
· @u ∈ S̊ub (S) such that ppair (t1, t2)q = puσq. Then π(H (pair (t1, t2))) = π(H (t1) ∪
H (t2)). Then by Lemma 10 we obtain pH (t1) ∪H (t2)q ⊆ Der ({π(H (pair (t1, t2)))}),
thus pH (t1)q ⊆ Der ({π(H (pair (t1, t2)))}). And then, by Lemma 10 we have that
π(H (t1)) ∈ Der (pH (t1)q). Therefore, by Lemma 14, π(H (pt1q)) = π(H (t1)) ∈
Der (π(H (pair (t1, t2)))).
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• pair (t1, t2)→ pt2q. Proof like above.
• · (t1, . . . , tm) → ptiq. We have π(H (· (t1, . . . , t2))) = π(H (t1) ∪ · · · ∪ H (tm)). Then
by Lemma 10, pH (t1) ∪ · · · ∪H (tm)q ⊆ Der (π(H (· (t1, . . . , tm)))); thus pH (ti)q ⊆
Der (π(H (· (t1, . . . , tm)))). As π(H (ti)) ∈ Der (pH (ti)q), by Lemma 14 we have π(H (ptiq)) =
π(H (ti)) ∈ Der (π(H (· (t1, . . . , t2)))).
As all possible cases satisfy lemma conditions, we proved the lemma.
B.5. Proof of Lemma 22
First, we show an auxiliary statement:
Lemma 25. For any term t, ∀s ∈ Sub (ptq)∃s′ ∈ Sub (t) : s = ps′q
Proof. Suppose the opposite and let us take s ∈ Sub (ptq) with maximal |Sub (s)| that
does not satisfy the desired property. Note that the “biggest” term in Sub (ptq), i.e. ptq,
does satisfy the property, as we can choose s′ = t ∈ Sub (t). By definition of Sub (·) if
s ∈ Sub (ptq) and s 6= ptq then ∃r ∈ Sub (ptq) such that
• r = bin (p, s) or r = bin (s, p) or r = priv (s). Without loss of generality we consider
only the first case (r = bin (p, s)) as other ones are similar. As |Sub (r)| > |Sub (s)|,
there exists r′ ∈ Sub (t) such that r = pr′q. By definition of p·q:
· either r′ = bin (p′, s′) and pp′q = p and ps′q = s. As s′ ∈ Sub (r′) ⊆ Sub (t) the
property is proved.
· or r′ = · (L) and pelems (L)q = {r}. Since ∀q ∈ elems (L) , root (q) 6= ·, then
∃q ∈ elems (L) : q = bin (p′, s′) and pp′q = p and ps′q = s. Using Lemma 6 we have
s′ ∈ Sub (t).
• r = · (L) and s ∈ L. Then (since |Sub (r)| > |Sub (s)|) we have ∃r′ ∈ Sub (t) : pr′q = r.
Thus r is normalized (r = pr′q = ppr′qq = prq), and thus, root (s) 6= ·. Then by
definition of p·q we have r′ = · (L′) and L ≈ pelems (L′)q, and thus, s ∈ pelems (L′)q,
that is ∃s′ ∈ elems (L′) : s = ps′q. Using again Lemma 6 we have s′ ∈ Sub (t).
2
Then, using Lemma 25 and the fact that p·q is deterministic, we obtain ∀p, q ∈
Sub (ptq) p 6= q ∃p′, q′ ∈ Sub (t) : p = pp′q ∧ q = pq′q ∧ p 6= q. And thus, |Sub (ptq)| ≤
|Sub (t)|.
B.6. Proof of Proposition 8
Proof. From Proposition 1 we know that if σ′ is a model of S then pσ′q is a model
of S and pσ′q is a model of pSq. Then, there exists a substitution θ : dom (θ) =
dom (pσ′q) , img (θ) ⊆ dom (θ) , σ′′ = pσ′q |img(θ) (where θ|V is a substitution obtained
from θ by narrowing its domain to set V ) and σ′′ is a model of pSq θ such that xσ′′ 6= yσ′′,
if x 6= y (this is true because we can show how to build θ : given the pσ′q — simply split
dom (pσ′q) into the classes of equivalence modulo pσ′q, i.e. x ≡ y ⇐⇒ x pσ′q = y pσ′q;
for every class choose one representative [x]≡, and then xθ = [x]≡). Note that θσ
′′ = σ′,
that’s why σ′′ is a model of pSq θ.
Then, as σ′′ is a model of pSq θ, using Proposition 1, we can say that σ′′ is a model of
ppSq θq. Moreover, xσ′′ 6= yσ′′, if ∀x, y ∈ dom (σ′′) x 6= y and σ′′ is normalized. Then, we
can apply Corollary 6, which gives us existence of conservative model δ of ppSq θq. That
is why we can apply Proposition 7: ∀x ∈ Vars (ppSq θq) , |Sub (xδ)| ≤ 2× |Sub (ppSq θq)|.
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Note that using Proposition 1, Lemma 19 and definition of “model”, we can easily
show that δ[θ] is a model of pSq. Moreover, δ[θ] is normalized. By definition of δ[θ] we
can say that ∀x ∈ dom (δ[θ]) ∃y ∈ dom (θ) θ : xδ[θ] = yδ and as y ∈ X (by definition of
θ), then |Sub (xδ[θ])| = |Sub (yδ)| ≤ 2 × |Sub (ppSq θq)| ≤ 2 × |Sub (pSq θ)|. Applying
Lemma 18, we have |Sub (xδ[θ])| ≤ 2× |Sub (pSq)|.
Summing up, we have a normalized model σ = δ[θ] of pSq such that for any x ∈ dom (σ)
we have |Sub (xσ)| ≤ 2× |Sub (pSq)|. 2
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